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The common law extends to a dog the "prestigious distinction" of
being entitled to one bite before its owner becomes strictly liable for
damages.' While this common law privilege for dog owners has been
largely abrogated by statute,2 the Supreme Court recently adopted a vari-
ation of it for employers of supervisors who sexually harass their subor-
dinates. 3 That variation, ostensibly grounded in traditional agency princi-
ples, generally entails that employers are now liable for the hostile
environment created by their supervisors, for the most part, only after be-
ing given a chance to react and failing to do so. In other words, for em-
ployers of harassing supervisors, as for the dog owners that preceded
them, the first bite is free.
Workplace sexual harassment is not a new phenomenon. 4 Female
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1.. See Turner v. Irvin, 246 S.E.2d 127, 128 (Ga. App. 1978) ("Dogs alone (maybe cats) have
been singled out among domestic animals, even where they are wrongfully in the place (violating
leash law) where they do their mischief, as attaining the prestigious distinction of being entitled to
the 'first bite.' "); see also King v. Breen, 560 So. 2d 186, 188 (Ala. 1990) ("Under the traditional
common law concerning injuries inflicted by domestic animals, the plaintiff had to allege and prove
that the animal's owner had prior knowledge of the animal's vicious propensities."); Westberry v.
Blackwell, 577 P.2d 75, 76 (Or. 1977) ("The general rule is that the owner of a dog or other domes-
tic animal is strictly liable for injuries caused by the animal only if the owner knows or has reason
to know of the animal's dangerous propensities.").
2. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 4.19-16 (West 1999) ("The owner of any dog which shall bite a
person while such person is on or in a public place, or lawfully on or in a private place, including
the property of the owner of the dog, shall be liable for such damages as may be suffered by the
person bitten, regardless of the former viciousness of such dog or the owner's knowledge of such vi-
ciousness."); see also Holland v. Buckley, 305 So. 2d 113, 115, 119 (La. 1974) (overruling previous
interpretation of Article 2321 of the Civil Code that the "dog gets the first bite free").
3. See generally Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc.
v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
4. This article focuses primarily on sexual harassment in the workplace and the standards for
employer liability. But sexual harassment is not confined to the workplace; schools, prisons, housing
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slaves were certainly exposed to unwelcome sexual advances and often
raped by their masters;5 female industrial workers in the early twentieth
century faced a barrage of sexual comments, threats, and attacks in the
factories where they worked; 6 and female clerical workers have long
been chased around desks by the men in control of their economic
destinies.7
Despite evolving ideas about sex equality and the advent of legal
remedies for harassment, sexual harassment continues to plague many
workers-most of them women 8-and pose an intractable barrier to true
workplace equality.9 The U.S. Merit Protections Board conducted the ear-
authorities, and other institutions are beginning to grapple with pervasive harassment and uncertain
legal remedies. See generally Marina Angel, Sexual Harassment by Judges, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 817
(1991); Cynthia G. Bowman, Street Harassment and the Informal Ghettoization of Women, 106
HARV. L. REV. 517 (1993); Kathleen Butler, Sexual Harassment in Rental Housing, 1989 U. ILL. L.
REV. 175; Regina Cahan, Home is No Haven: An Analysis of Sexual Harassment in Housing, 1987
Wis. L. REV. 1061; Kathy Lee Collins, Student-to-Student Sexual Harassment Under litle IX: The
Legal and Practical Issues, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 789 (1998); Martha T. McCluskey, Privileged Vio-
lence, Principled Fantasy, and Feminist Method: The Colby Fraternity Case, 44 ME. L. REV. 261
(1992); James E. Robertson, Cruel and Unusual Punishment in United States Prisons: Sexual Har-
assment Among Male Inmates, 36 AM. CRI. L. REV. 1 (1999); Ronna G. Schneider, Sexual Harass-
ment and Higher Education, 65 TEX. L. REV. 525 (1987); Robert Brown, Jr. & Marjorie Van Ochten,
Sexual Harassment: A Vulnerable Area for Corrections, CORRECTIONS TODAY, Aug. 1990, at 62.
5. See KERRY SEGRAVE, THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WOMEN IN THE WORKPLACE, 1600 TO
1993, at 16-17 (1994) (noting that sexual harassment and abuse of female slaves was rampant in
America); see also LIN FARLEY, SEXUAL SHAKEDOWN: THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WOMEN ON THE
JOB 40-44 (1978) (describing sexual exploitation of slave women by their masters).
6. See SEGRAVE, supra note 5, at 61-80.
7. See id. at 103-22. For historical work on sexual harassment, see generally FARLEY, supra
note 5; Elvia R. Arriola, What's the Big Deal? Women in the New York City Construction Industry
and Sexual Harassment Law, 1970-85, 22 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 21 (1990); Jill L. Goodman,
Sexual Harassment: Some Observations on the Distance Traveled and the Distance Yet to Go, 10
CAP. U. L. REV. 445 (1981).
8. See, e.g., BARBARA A. GUTEK, SEX AND THE WORKPLACE: THE IMPACT OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR
AND HARASSMENT ON WOMEN, MEN, AND ORGANIZATIONS 47 (1985); J.B. Pryor, Sexual Harassment
Proclivities in Men, 17 SEX ROLES 269, 269-71 (1987); Stephanie Riger, Gender Dilemmas in Sexual
Harassment Policies and Procedures, 46 J. AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 497 (1991).
9. Beyond the scope of this article are two ongoing feminist debates concerning why sexual
harassment constitutes sex discrimination and how to conceptualize the harm of sexual harassment.
For thoughtful and interesting dialogue on these two questions, see generally Kathryn Abrams, The
New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1169 (1998) (offering an account of
sexual harassment based on systematic efforts-using sexual and non-sexual conduct--to entrench
masculine norms in the workplace); Kathryn Abrams, Postscript, Spring 1998: A Response to Profes-
sors Bernstein and Franke, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1257 (1998); Anita Bemstein, Treating Sexual Har-
assment with Respect, I I I HARV. L. REV. 445 (1997) (conceptualizing sexual harassment as a digni-
tary harm); Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691,
762-70 (1997) (explaining harm of sexual harassment by "technology of sexism" that polices gender
roles); Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1687 (1998) (con-
ceptualizing sexual harassment around a theory of workplace competence as "designed to maintain
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liest systematic survey of sexual harassment in the workplace and found
that four out of ten women reported having experienced sexual harass-
ment within the previous two years.'0 Later surveys and studies have
reached similar conclusions." Lawsuits have revealed that no industry is
immune: rampant sexual harassment has been found in the military,' 2 in
law firms,' 3 in car manufacturing plants, 4 in pharmaceutical companies, 5
on cruise ships,' 6 and in a wide variety of other settings. 7
. . . highly rewarded lines of work as-bastions of masculine competence and authority"). See also
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINA-
"noN 1-23 (1979) (conceptualizing sexual harassment in terms of institutional subordination of wo-
men to men in the workplace, motivated by the male impulse to exert sexual dominance over
women).
10. See U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD. SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORK-
PLACE: IS IT A PROBLEM? 33 (1981); see also Claire Safran, What Men Do to Women on the Job,
REDBOOK, Nov. 1976, at 217.
I1. See, e.g., FARLEY, supra note 5, at 18-21 (discussing studies and surveys finding wide-
spread sexual harassment); GUrEK, supra note 8, at 42-60; U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD.
SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE: AN UPDATE (1988); Douglas D. Baker et al., The
Influence of Individual Characteristics and Severity of Harassing Behavior on Reactions to Sexual
Harassment, 22 SEX ROLES 305, 305-06 (1990); Susan R. Meredith, Using Fact Finders to Probe
Workplace Claims of Sexual Harassment, 47 ARB. J. 61, 61 (1992) (citing studies which estimate that
50 to 80 percent of female workers have been sexually harassed); Beth E. Schneider, Consciousness
About Sexual Harassment Among Heterosexual and Lesbian Women Workers, 38 J. Soc. ISSUES 75,
83-85 (1982). The EEOC reports that sexual harassment complaints rose from 10,532 in 1992 to
15,222 in 1999, with the total monetary payout to claimants, based on administrative claims as op-
posed to litigation, rising from $12.7 million to $50.3 million during that same period. See U.S.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Sexual Harassment Charges EEOC and FEPAs Com-
bined: FY 1992-FY 1999 (visited Feb. 5, 2000) <http.//www.eeoc.gov/stats/harass.htmi>.
12. See Lieutenant Commander J. Richard Chema, Arresting "Tailhook": The Prosecution of
Sexual Harassment in the Military, 140 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1993); Pentagon Forgoes Inquiry of Gen-
eral, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), Apr. 15, 2000, available in 2000 WL 5653024 (discussing
allegation of sexual harassment made by Army's highest-ranking female officer); see also Specht v.
Dalton, No. 97-56744, 1999 WL 1038255 (9th Cir. 1999).
13. See, e.g., Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 510, 541 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)
(affirming multi-million dollar judgment against law firm for sexual harassment of secretary by
partner).
14. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Harassment Settlement Approved, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1998, at D20
(reporting that a district judge approved a payment of $34 million by Mitsubishi Motors Corporation
to settle a sexual harassment case brought on behalf of female factory workers by EEOC, following
on the heels of a $9.5 million payment to settle private sexual harassment lawsuits from other wo-
men in the factory).
15. See, e.g., Andrew Stephen, Fondle a Woman, Pay $250,000, NEW STATESMAN, June 14,
1999, at 20 (reporting on pharmaceutical giant Astra's payment of $10 million to settle a sexual har-
assment suit involving 120 complainants).
16. See, e.g., Douglas Frantz, Cruise Line Reports 62 Alleged Sex Assaults Since '93, N.Y.
TIMES, July 14, 1999, at A14 (reporting that Carnival Cruise Lines, defending against a sexual har-
assment suit brought by a former employee, revealed 62 incidents of sexual assault on board its
cruise ships in the past five years); Patricia King, Love Just Wasn't In Their Stars, NEWSWEEK, Dec.
21, 1998, at 57 (reporting on lawsuit against Crystal Cruises brought by gift-shop worker against
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Changing attitudes and legal structures have not extinguished harass-
ment in the workplace. However, a significant body of law-rooted in
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964-that is designed to protect
workers from sexual harassment has emerged. Arguably the most signifi-
cant recent legal developments concern employer liability, for victims of
harassment need to prove not only that they were harassed in violation of
federal law, but also that someone should be held liable for the
harassment.
In June, 1998, the Supreme Court issued two decisions, Burlington
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth5 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,19 that es-
tablished new standards for employer liability for sexual harassment. 20
Although the two cases presented different questions and factual predi-
cates, the Court adopted a unified holding with respect to employer lia-
bility for supervisor harassment. An employer is automatically liable for
harassment culminating in a tangible employment action against the vic-
tim. However, when a harassing supervisor takes no tangible employment
action against his victim, the employer's liability is subject to an affirma-
ship captain based on alleged sexual assault)! The lawsuits seem to have only scratched the surface
of the problem. See, e.g., Douglas Frantz, On Cruise Ships, Silence Shrouds Crimes, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 16, 1998, at Al (providing a special report finding a pattern of sexual harassment and assault
and carefully planned cover-ups on many cruise lines).
17. See, e.g., Melinda Ligos, Harassment Suits Hit the Dot-Cons, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2000,
at GI (describing proliferation of harassment suits against internet start-up companies, attributable in
part to the "anti-corporate" structure and concomitant lack of policies and procedures common in
the industry). Studies of particular workforces and institutions have also found the incidence of sex-
ual harassment to be high. See, e.g., Alice J. Dan et al., Sexual Harassment as an Occupational Haz-
ard in Nursing, 17 BASIC AND APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL 563, 567 (1995) (noting that 88.5% of nurses
surveyed reported one or more incidents of harassment by physicians); Louise F. Fitzgerald &
Alayne J. Ormerod, Breaking Silence: The Sexual Harassment of Women in Academia and the Work-
place, in PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN: A HANDBOOK OF ISSUES AND THEORIES 553, 559 (Florence L.
Denmark & Michelle A. Paludi eds., 1993) (estimating that 50% of female university students will
experience sexual harassment at some point); Edward Lafontaine & Leslie Tredeau, The Frequency,
Sources, and Correlates of Sexual Harassment Among Women in Traditional Male Occupations, 15
SEX ROLES 433, 436 (1986) (reporting on higher levels of harassment in traditionally male occupa-
tions); Margaret Collinson & David Collinson, "It's Only Dick": The Sexual Harassment of Women
Managers in Insurance Sales, 10 WORK. EMPLOYMENT & Soc'Y 29, 44 (1996) (reporting, based on
qualitative analysis, widespread harassment of women in insurance sales, a non-traditional area of fe-
male employment); Ronnie Sandroff, Sexual Harassment in the Fortune 500, WORKING WOMAN,
Dec. 1998, at 69 (reporting that 90% of large corporations have received complaints of sexual
harassment).
18. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
19. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
20. A third decision from the October 1997 term established that same-sex sexual harassment
may be actionable under Title VII provided the victim can prove that the conduct occurred "because
of sex." See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Svcs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
[Vol. 61:671
EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR SEXUAL HARRASSMENT
tive defense based on the employer's efforts to prevent and correct har-
assment and the victim's unreasonable failure to take advantage of oppor-
tunities to avoid or mitigate harm.2' With that holding, the Supreme
Court purported to establish a standard of liability more stringent for em-
ployers than one of mere negligence. 22
Many commentators interpreted the new standards as a blow to em-
ployers based on the perception that employers would now be held ac-
countable for workplace harassment without regard to their culpability.23
The thesis of this article is that the conventional wisdom with respect to
Faragher and Ellerth is dead wrong. Those decisions, far from imposing
additional liability on innocent employers, have instead created a virtual
safe harbor that protects employers from liability unless their own con-
duct is found wanting. This protection for employers comes at a high
price, depriving some victims of actionable sexual harassment of legal
redress.
Part I of this article outlines the new standards for employer liability
for supervisory harassment and their doctrinal underpinnings. The Court
in Faragher and Ellerth noted that negligence provides a minimum stan-
dard of liability for harassment by any employee, but concluded that in
addition employers can be held vicariously liable for supervisor harass-
21. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
22. There has been an onslaught of academic commentary on these decisions. See generally
Francis Achampong, Employer Liability for Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment by a Supervisor:
A Critical Assessment of the Supreme Court's New Vicarious Liability Standard, 28 Sw. U. L. REV.
45 (1998); Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment in Hostile Environment Cases, 34
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 71 (1999); Susan Bisom-Rapp, Bulletproofing the Workplace: Symbol and
Substance in Employment Discrimination Law Practice, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 959 (1999); Paul
Buchanan & Courtney W. Wiswall, The Evolving Understanding of Workplace Harassment and Em-
ployer Liability: Implications of Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under Title VII, 34 WAKE FoREsT
L. REV. 55 (1999); Estelle D. Franklin, Maneuvering Through the Labyrinth: The Employers' Para-
dox in Responding to Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment-A Proposed Way Out, 67 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1517 (1999); B. Glenn George, Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment: The Buck Stops
Where?, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. I (1999); Isabel M. Medina, A Matter of Fact: Hostile Environ-
ments and Summary Judgments, 8 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STuD. 311 (1999); Steven M. War-
shawsky, Ellerth and Faragher: Towards Strict Employer Liability Under Title VII for Supervisory
Sexual Harassment, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMPLOYMENT L. 303 (1999); Susan Webber Wright, Uncer-
tainties in the Law of Sexual Harassment, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 11 (1999).
23. See, e.g., Stephen Kent Madsen, Placing the Blame Where it Does Not Belong: Burlington
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 35 IDAHO L. REV. 311 (1999); Daniel J. Harmelink, Note, Employer Sexual
Harassment Policies: The Forgotten Key to the Prevention of Supervisor Hostile Environment Har-
assment, 84 IOWA L. REV. 561 (1999); Brian S. Kruse, Note, Strike One-You're Out! Cautious Em-
ployers Lose Under New Sexual Harassment Law: Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 78 NEB. L. REV.
444 (1999); David James Schaibley, See No Evil, Hear No Evil, Be Vicariously Liable, 22 HAMLINE
L. REV. 531 (1999); Angela Scott, Employers Beware! The United States Supreme Court Opens the
Floodgates on Employer Liability Under Title VII, 24 S. ILL. U. LJ. 157 (1999).
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ment based on the agency principle that holds masters liable for the ac-
tions of their servants when those servants are aided by the agency rela-
tion.24 Because supervisors who harass their subordinates meet that test,
agency principles justify holding employers vicariously liable for the har-
assment. However, the Court fell short of a pure rule of strict vicarious
liability by providing employers with an affirmative defense in cases
where the supervisor did not take any tangible employment action against
the victim (namely, hostile environment cases). 25 An employer who can
prove the affirmative defense can reduce its damages or escape liability
altogether.2 6
Part II of the article revisits these new standards as applied to a se-
ries of hypothetical cases and demonstrates that the standards of liability
are far more indulgent to employers than an abstract discussion suggests.
The effective standard of employer liability turns primarily on the con-
struction of the affirmative defense. If the affirmative defense affects
only the remedies available, then the standard adopted more closely ap-
proximates strict liability: the employer's after-the-fact efforts to stop the
harassment and the victim's failure to complain do not negate liability,
but instead mitigate damages. If, however, the affirmative defense ne-
gates liability even for the prior acts, then the effective standard becomes
far more lenient to employers-hence, the first free bite.
The Supreme Court split the difference by dictating that the affirma-
tive defense operates as a bar to liability where the plaintiff had the op-
portunity to prevent the harm, but only as a bar to damages where the
plaintiff could have prevented some but not all of the harm.27 In striking
this compromise, the Supreme Court took one step away from the auto-
matic liability standard it purported to adopt. The lower courts have
taken an additional step. The distinction between these two categories has
been obliterated by trial and appellate courts interpreting the affirmative
defense who have held--expressly or impliedly-that it always operates
to eliminate liability.28
24. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 802; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754.
25. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
26. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. Whether the afTirmative de-
fense affects damages or liability is examined in Part ii, infra.
27. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
28. See, e.g., Watkins v. Professional Security Bureau, Ltd., No. 98-2555, 1999 U.S. App.
LEXIS 29841 (4th Cir. Nov. 15, 1999); Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F3d 258 (5th Cir.
1999); Scrivener v. Socorro Independent School District, 169 F.3d 969 (5th Cir. 1999); Shaw v.
Autozone, Inc., 180 F3d 806 (7th Cir. 1999); Todd v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 175 F.3d 595 (8th Cir.
1999); Wright v. Anixter, Inc., No. 98-17164, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 19962 (9th Cir. Aug. 18,
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Part III critiques the new standards in theory and practice. The Su-
preme Court would have the affirmative defense sometimes affect dam-
ages and sometimes affect liability, while lower courts would have it
only affect liability. However, this part of the article argues that the af-
firmative defense should never affect liability, but only damages. As ap-
plied, the affirmative defense undermines Title VII's goal of compensat-
ing victims of discrimination while not serving its deterrence rationale.
Moreover, construing the affirmative defense to bar liability in some or
all cases is inconsistent with the agency principles that underlie the rule,
as well as the doctrine of avoidable consequences that the Court tried to
implement. More troubling still, the rule unfairly penalizes women who
do not file formal complaints, despite the well-documented reality that
most sexual harassment victims do not report such conduct through inter-
nal grievance mechanisms. Taken together, these effects severely limit
the ability of the Faragher and Ellerth scheme to ensure that women are
compensated for the debilitating effects of sexual harassment or to make
any meaningful contribution to women's equality in the workplace.
Finally, Part IV critiques the Court for ignoring the many instances
in civil rights law where mitigating factors have not been permitted to af-
fect the threshold finding of liability. This part proposes a legislative cor-
rection to the problem created by Faragher and Ellerth, one which
strikes a reasonable compromise between the competing interests of em-
ployers and victims while remaining faithful to the underlying goals of
Title VII.
I. THE NEW LAW OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT: IN THEORY
In Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,29 the Supreme Court recog-
nized that two varieties of sexual harassment-quid pro quo and hostile
work environment-are forms of sex discrimination prohibited by Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.30 Only briefly examining the issue
1999); Coates v. Sundor Brands, Inc., 164 F.3d 1361 (1lth Cir. 1999); Gunnell v. Utah Valley State
College, 152 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 1998); Guerra v. Editorial Televisa-USA, Inc., No. 97-3670,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10082 (S.D. Fla. June 4, 1999); EEOC v. Barton Protective Svcs., 47 F.
Supp. 2d 57 (D.D.C. 1999); Hetreed v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 96-C2021, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7219 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 1999); Neal v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., No. 5:98-CV-521-B4(2), 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9732 (E.D.N.C. 1999); Russell v. American Eagle Airlines, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d
1330 (S.D. Fla. 1999); Fierro v. Saks Fifth Avenue, 13 F Supp. 2d 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Sconce v.
Tandy Corp., 9 F. Supp. 2d 773 (W.D. Ky. 1998); Montero v. AGCO Corp., 19 F. Supp. 2d 1143
(E.D. Cal. 1998); Jones v. USA Petroleum Corp., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1379 (S.D. Ga. 1998).
29. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
30. See id. at 65-66. Title Vii of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides, in relevant part:
[iut shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to fail or refuse to hire or
2000]
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of employer liability, the Court rejected a rule of automatic liability as
well as one requiring actual notice. 31 The Court then directed lower
courts to look to agency principles to determine when, on this narrowed
continuum, employers should be liable for sexual harassment in the
workplace.32
Armed with the Supreme Court's instructions, lower courts looked
to somewhat amorphous "agency principles" to determine whether em-
ployers could or should be held liable for sexual harassment under vari-
ous circumstances. Those courts ventured in multiple directions and
reached wildly inconsistent results. Most of the resulting opinions varied
as to (1) whether employers could be held liable for harassment about
which they had no notice; 33 (2) what significance to give an employer's
sexual harassment policy in determining that employer's liability;34 and
(3) how to treat plaintiffs who failed to make use of available policies
and grievance procedures.35 Those questions, and more, were answered
by the Supreme Court in Faragher and Ellerth. This part will examine
the two categories of actionable harassment and discuss the new rules of
liability that apply to each.
to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individ-
ual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1994). The protection against sexual harassment is drawn from the lan-
guage about discrimination in the terms or conditions of employment. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998); Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64.
31. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
32. See id. The Supreme Court interpreted Title VII, which defines the term "employer" to
include "agents," to require this analysis. See id.; Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742,
763-64 (1998).
33. Compare Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that an
employer can be liable for supervisor harassment without regard to knowledge or recklessness in
hostile work environment cases), with Katz v. Dole, 709 F2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding that
the plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer had knowledge of hostile work environment to be
found liable).
34. Compare Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F3d 1437, 1450 (10th Cir. 1997) (stressing
the importance of an employer's sexual harassment policy when determining liability), with Kracunas
v. lona College, 119 F.3d 80, 89 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that the existence of a sexual harassment pol-
icy with reasonable complaint procedures does not insulate an employer from liability).
35. Compare Splunge v. Shoney's Inc., 97 F.3d 488, 490 (1lth Cir. 1996) (suggesting that a
plaintiff's failure to complain, notwithstanding the existence of an effective harassment policy, could
insulate the employer from liability), with Tipp v. Amsouth Bank, 76 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1329-30
(S.D. Ala. 1998) (finding plaintiff's failure to complain only impacts a jury's consideration of
whether she acted reasonably; it does not establish that she did, in fact, act unreasonably).
[Vol. 61:671
EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR SEXUAL HARRASSMENT
A. Actionable Sexual Harassment
Since Catharine MacKinnon first coined the terms and the underly-
ing analysis in 1979,36 courts have distinguished between quid pro quo
and hostile work environment harassment. Finding conceptual utility in
MacKinnon's distinction, courts uniformly identified these two categories
in analyzing harassment cases, though they disagreed about the dividing
line. Those disagreements became important, ultimately, because courts
applied different standards for employer liability depending on the type
of harassment.
1. Classic Quid Pro Quo Harassment
Before Faragher and Ellerth, courts uniformly understood quid pro
quo harassment to include the classic case where a supervisor takes an
adverse action against a subordinate employee based on the employee's
refusal to submit to sexual advances.37 Almost as uniformly, courts
agreed that employer liability for such harassment was automatic; that is,
an employer Would be held liable for quid pro quo harassment regardless
of notice, the existence of an anti-harassment policy, or action taken in
response to the harassment.38 Courts differed, however, as to the treat-
ment of two variations on the classic case: (1) when a supervisor threat-
36. See MACKINNON, supra note 9, at 32 (dividing "women's experiences of sexual harass-
ment" into two categories: (1) harassment "in which sexual compliance is exchanged, or proposed to
be exchanged, for an employment opportunity;" or (2) sexual harassment that is a "persistent condi-
tion of work").
37. See, e.g., Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 496 (7th Cir. 1997); Gary v.
Long, 59 F.3d 1391. 1396 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Recently, some states have taken steps to criminalize
quid pro quo harassment in employment. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 763 (Supp. 1998); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-395.1 (1993); TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN. § 39.03 (West 1994); see also Carrie N.
Baker, Sexual Extortion: Criminalizing Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment, 13 LAW & INEQ. J. 213,
214 (1994) (advocating for treatment of quid pro quo harassment as a crime).
38. See, e.g., Davis v. Sioux City, 115 F.3d 1365, 1367 (8th Cir. 1997); Martin v. Cavalier
Hotel Corp., 48 F.3d 1343, 1351 n.3 (4th Cir. 1995); Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 513-14 (9th Cir.
1994); Bouton v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 29 F.3d 103, 106-07 (3d Cir. 1994); Kaufmann v. Allied
Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178, 185-86 (6th Cir. 1992); Carrero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d
569, 579 (2d Cir. 1989); Lipsett v. Univ. of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 901 (Ist Cir. 1988); Horn v.
Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599, 606 (7th Cir. 1985); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 909 (11th
Cir. 1982); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also Meritor Savings Bank,
FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 59 (1986) (noting with approval the position taken by the EEOC in its
brief before the Court that employers are strictly liable for quid pro quo harassment); EEOC. GUIDE-
LINES ON DISCRIMINATION BECAUSE OF SEX, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (c) (1998) (imposing strict liability).
But see Sims v. Brown & Root Indus. Servs., 889 F. Supp. 920, 925-27 (W.D. La. 1995) (requiring
proof of employer negligence as prerequisite to liability for hostile environment or quid pro quo
harassment).
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ens adverse job action in order to extort sexual consideration from an
employee, but fails to carry out his threats despite the employee's refusal
to submit, and (2) when an employee submits to a supervisor's sexual
advances to avoid the threatened adverse action or obtain the promised
benefit. Federal courts split on whether these "unfulfilled threats" and
"submission" cases fit under the quid pro quo umbrella.3 9
2. "New" Quid Pro Quo
The Court in Ellerth redrew the boundaries for quid pro quo harass-
ment. The plaintiff in that case, Kimberly Ellerth, was a salesperson for
Burlington Industries.4 She was indirectly supervised by Ted Slowik, a
mid-level manager with the authority to hire, promote, and fire employ-
ees subject to approval by higher-ups. 41 Slowik allegedly subjected El-
lerth to repeated unwelcome sexual advances and made several comments
indicating that her success at Burlington was contingent on her submis-
sion to his advances. 42 Although Ellerth refused his advances, Slowik
never carried through with his threats.43
The Court refused to treat unfulfilled threats as actionable under a
quid pro quo theory of harassment, holding that:
[w]hen a plaintiff proves that a tangible employment action resulted from a refusal
to submit to a supervisor's sexual demands, he or she establishes that the employ-
ment decision itself constitutes a change in the terms and conditions of employ-
ment that is actionable under Title VII. For any sexual harassment preceding the
employment decision to be actionable, however, the conduct must be severe or
pervasive."
Thus under Ellerth, a simple threat of adverse action or a promise
of benefits is not sufficient to transform a claim of hostile environment
into a claim of quid pro quo.45 Plaintiffs suing based on unfulfilled
39. Compare Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 779 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that the
mere threat of adverse action conditioned on sexual submission constitutes a quid pro quo violation
of Title VII), and Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1292 (3d Cir. 1997) (same), and
Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 1994) (same), with Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391 (D.C.
Cir. 1995) (only fulfilled threats constitute an actionable quid pro quo).
40. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 747 (1998).
41. See id
42. See id.
43. See id at 748.
44. Id. at 753-54 (emphasis added).
45. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754 (classifying Ellerth's claim as hostile environment because
she alleged only unfulfilled threats); see also Grozdanich v. Leisure Hills Health Ctr., 25 F. Supp. 2d
953, 968 (D. Minn. 1998) (stating that Ellerth "strongly suggests that unwelcome sexual advances,
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threats, then, must use the hostile environment rubric and, as explained
below, will be subject to a different rule of employer liability.46
The principal substantive distinction between harassment resulting in
a tangible employment action (quid pro quo) and that not so resulting
(hostile environment) is that the latter requires a showing that the harass-
ment was severe and pervasive, while the former simply requires evi-
dence that some tangible employment action was taken based on an em-
ployee's refusal to submit to a supervisor's sexual advances. 47 Proof of a
single threat that results in a tangible employment action will be suffi-
cient to prove quid pro quo harassment in violation of Title VII,48
whereas a single unfulfilled threat likely will not be sufficiently severe or
pervasive to mount a hostile environment claim.49
The proper treatment of submission cases after Ellerth is less clear.
The petition for certiorari limited the question presented to whether the
plaintiff stated a claim for quid pro quo harassment under Title VII when
she "neither submitted to the sexual advances of the alleged harasser nor
suffered any tangible effects ... as a consequence of a refusal to submit
which are accompanied by an unfulfilled threat of tangible, adverse employment consequences,
should be analyzed only as a form of hostile work environment harassment"); Gallagher v. Delaney,
139 F.3d 338, 346-47 (2d Cir. 1998); Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657, 669 (E.D. Ark. 1998); Pon-
ticelli v. Zurich Am. Ins. Group, 16 F. Supp. 2d 414, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
46. See infra text accompanying notes 62-77.
47. The Court in Ellerth strongly cautioned against relying on categories of harassment for
purposes of determining employer liability. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 751. However, the Court simply
redefined the categories and then adopted its own "categorical" rule for liability. See id. at 753. Us-
ing the Court's analysis, the distinction between cases that constitute per se discrimination (quid pro
quo) and those that require a showing of severity and pervasiveness (hostile environment) in order to
be actionable is identical to the distinction between cases that merit the pure rule of automatic liabil-
ity and those in which liability is limited by the affirmative defense. For both the threshold question
of discrimination and the secondary question of liability, the line is drawn between cases in which a
tangible employment action is taken against the victim employee based on her refusal to submit and
cases in which no such action is taken. See id. at 753-54 (indicating where tangible employment ac-
tion is taken, the harassment is actionable without showing it was severe and pervasive); see id. at
765 (indicating where tangible employment action is taken, employer is automatically liable, subject
to no defenses). This syllogism results from the fact that when a supervisor takes a tangible employ-
ment action against an employee who refused his advances, the terms and conditions of her employ-
ment have been altered (which satisfies the threshold question of discrimination) and the supervisor
has Without question been aided by the agency relation in accomplishing the harassment (which sat-
isfies the secondary question of employer liability).
48. See id. at 752 (noting that both theories state violations of Title VII but that hostile envi-
ronment harassment must be severe and pervasive).
49. See id. at 754 ("We express no opinion as to whether a single unfulfilled threat is suffi-
cient to constitute discrimination in the terms or conditions of employment [under a hostile environ-
ment theory].").
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to those advances." 50 The Court limited its consideration to the facts
before it in which the plaintiff refused her supervisor's advances, and no
consensus on the proper characterization of submission cases has since
emerged. The only court faced squarely with such a case refused to treat
it as a quid pro quo harassment.5'
The EEOC guidelines on employer liability, revised to reflect the
holdings in Faragher and Ellerth, explicitly adopt the position that an
employment benefit received as a result of submission to a supervisor's
sexual advances qualifies as a "tangible employment action" for pur-
poses of employer liability.52 According to the EEOC, "[t]he Supreme
Court stated that there must be a significant change in employment sta-
tus; it did not require that the change be adverse in order to qualify as
tangible."'5 3 Under this interpretation, where a subordinate employee ob-
tains a promised benefit because of her submission, she need not prove
the conduct was severe or pervasive.54 Even the EEOC's broad interpreta-
50. Brief for Petitioner Burlington Indus., Inc. at i, Ellerth (No. 97-569); see also Ellerth, 524
U.S. at 761-47 ("We decide whether, under Title VII ... an employee who refuses the unwelcome
and threatening sexual advances of a supervisor, yet suffers no adverse, tangible job consequences,
can recover against the employer without showing the employer is negligent or otherwise at fault for
the supervisor's actions.").
51. See Hetreed v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 96-C2021, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7219 (N.D. Ill.
May 12, 1999), at *13 (rejecting argument that submission to supervisor's unwelcome sexual ad-
vances constituted tangible job detriment under Ellerth). But see Hurley v. Atlantic City Police
Dep't, 174 F3d 95, 133 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating in dicta that plaintiff alleging quid pro quo harass-
ment must show either that she submitted or that tangible employment action was taken based on her
refusal to submit); Sconce v. Tandy Corp., 9 F. Supp. 2d 773, 775 (W.D. Ky. 1998) (suggesting that
quid pro quo category includes submission cases).
52. See EEOC, Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Employer Liability for Unlawful Harassment
by Supervisors (June 21, 1999) <http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/harassment.html> at 6
If a supervisor undertakes or recommends a tangible job action based on a subordinate's re-
sponse to unwelcome sexual demands, the employer is liable and cannot raise the affirmative
defense. The result is the same whether the employee rejects the demands and is subjected to
an adverse tangible employment action or submits to the demands and consequently obtains a
tangible job benefit. [hereinafter EEOC Revised Policy Guidance].
Id. The EEOC's revised guidance, issued June 21, 1999, supersedes previous guidance relating to
employer liability.
53. Id. This interpretation of Ellerth is not universally shared. See generally Corporate Educa-
tional Services, EEOC Explains When You're Liable for Supervisors' Sexual, Racial, Other Harass-
ment, 6 No. 5 Iowa Employment L. Letter 4 (1999) (taking the position that quid pro quo claims do
not involve situations where employees submit and benefit from harassment); Janice Goodman, Sig-
nificant Development in Discrimination Law, 591 PLI/Lit 601, 605 (1998) (questioning whether an
employer is liable for quid pro quo conduct to which the employee submits and benefits from a su-
pervisor's sexual harassment); see also John D. Canoni, Sexual Harassment: The New Liability, 46
RISK Mopmr., Jan. 1, 1999, at 12 ("A tangible employment action must first be adverse. This ...
means that employees cannot complain if they receive job benefits from a harassing situation ....
54. See EEOC Revised Policy Guidance, supra note 52.
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tion of Faragher and Ellerth does not account for cases where the victim
submits to avoid harm rather than to obtain a benefit. In such cases, the
supervisor does not need to take a tangible employment action-benefi-
cial or detrimental-for his threat has successfully coerced the victim's
compliance.
The cornerstone of a new quid pro quo case is "tangible employ-
ment action," which the Supreme Court defined as "a significant change
in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassign-
ment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a
significant change in benefits." 5 While the Court attempted to give con-
tent to its newly created category by explaining that a tangible employ-
ment action will often inflict direct economic harm,56 lower courts are
struggling with its precise contours. Certainly an employee who is fired
suffers a tangible employment action, as does an employee who is de-
moted or suffers a reduction in pay or benefits. 57 But other, less drastic
changes in working conditions are more difficult to categorize.5" Early
cases agree that neither constructive discharge59 nor voluntary actions
taken by a plaintiff (e.g., requesting transfer to avoid contact with the
harasser) will suffice6° and suggest that the concept of tangible action is
55. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761. The plaintiff must also prove a causal link between the tangible
employment action and her refusal to comply with the supervisor's sexual demands. See, e.g., For-
shee v. Waterloo Indus., Inc., 178 F3d 527, 530 (8th Cir. 1999) (reviewing, in light of Ellerth, evi-
dence of causal connection between plaintiff's termination and her refusal to submit to supervisor's
sexual demands); Guerra v. Editorial Televisa-USA, No. 97-3670-CIV, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10082, at *19-21 (S.D. Fla. June 4, 1999) (rejecting quid pro quo type claim because plaintiff failed
to link tangible employment action to rebuff of supervisor's advances).
56. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762.
57. See id. at 761.
58. Compare Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating that
the "concept of a tangible adverse employment action is not limited to changes in compensation...
[it] includes the loss of significant job benefits or characteristics, such as the resources necessary for
an employee to do his or her job"), and id. at 153 ("the loss of [plaintiff's] office, the dismissal of
her secretary, the missing files, and the lapse assignments that led to a fifty percent pay decrease are
tangible adverse employment actions under Ellerth and Faragher"), with Reinhold v. Virginia, 151
F.3d 172, 175 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding, in light of Ellerth, that the imposition of additional work was
not a tangible employment action because "she does not allege that she experienced a change in her
employment status akin to a demotion or a reassignment entailing significantly different job responsi-
bilities"), and Watts v. Kroger Co., 170 F.3d 505, 510 (5th Cir. 1999) (concluding that additional
work does not constitute tangible job detriment under Ellerth).
59. See, e.g., Dunegan v. City of Council Grove, No. 97-4039-RDR, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18581, at *14-15 (D. Kan. Nov. 30, 1999); Richardson v. New York State Dep't of Correctional
Servs., 180 F.3d 426, 436 (2d Cir. 1999).
60. See, e.g., Butler v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 161 F.3d 263, 268 (5th Cir. 1998) (no tangible
employment action where teacher voluntarily withdrew from extracurricular activities to avoid sus-
pected harassment from school principal); Sconce v. Tandy Corp., 9 F. Supp. 2d 773, 776 (W.D. Ky.
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being construed more narrowly in the wake of Ellerth than before. 6'
3. Hostile Work Environment Harassment
Sexual harassment that does not result in a tangible employment ac-
tion is actionable, if at all, under a hostile work environment theory.62
Hostile environment harassment is based on the notion that unwelcome
sexual conduct, if sufficiently severe or pervasive, violates Title VII be-
cause it alters the terms and conditions of employment on the basis of
sex.
63
The Court in Faragher reviewed the course of and approved the
rules governing hostile environment harassment in examining plaintiff
Beth Ann Faragher's claim that she was subjected to a sexually hostile
environment at the hands of her immediate supervisors while serving as a
lifeguard for the City of Boca Raton. 64 A hostile work environment may
be created by conduct of a sexual or sex-based nature, 65 whether verbal,
1998) (finding that a voluntary transfer to lower paying job does not constitute tangible employment
action).
61. Compare Savino v. C.P. Hall Co., 199 F.3d 925, 923 n.8 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding that a
victim's transfer to another office is not a tangible employment action under Ellerth) with Bryson v.
Chicago State Univ., 96 F.3d 912, 917 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding tangible job detriment where univer-
sity professor was stripped of one title and barred from committee work based on theory that
"[diepriving someone of the building blocks for ... a promotion .. .is just as serious as depriving
her of the job itself"), and Crady v. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 993 F2d 132, 136 (7th Cir.
1993) ("A materially adverse change might be indicated by a termination of employment, a demo-
tion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits,
significantly diminished material responsibilities, or other indices that might be unique to the particu-
lar situation.") (cited with approval in Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761).
62. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754.
63. See id. at 752. Harassment that is sex-based, as opposed to sexual, is equally a violation
of Title VII. See, e.g., Williams v. General Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 565 (6th Cir. 1999)
("[C]onduct underlying a sexual harassment claim need not be overtly sexual in nature. Any unequal
treatment of an employee that would not occur but for the employee's gender may ... constitute a
hostile environment in violation of Title VII."); see also Schultz, supra note 9, at 1769 (urging rec-
ognition of nonsexual forms of harassment in addition to or in place of sexual conduct); cf Oncale
v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (holding that the "because of sex" requirement
may be met in cases involving same-sex harassment where conduct is motivated by animus or hostil-
ity to one sex).
64. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 780, 810 (1998).
65. The Faragher/Ellerth holding has been applied to harassment on any unlawful basis, not
just harassment based on sex. Indeed, the Court in Faragher commended lower courts for drawing
on racial harassment cases in roping the contours of a sexually hostile environment claim. See, 524
U.S. at 788. Moreover, the EEOC's revised guidelines, which explicitly apply the standards of
Faragher and Ellerth to all unlawful harassment---based on "race, color, sex (whether or not of a
sexual nature), religion, national origin, protected activity, age, or disability,"-are entitled to some
deference. EEOC Revised Policy Guidance, supra note 52 ("[T]he standard of liability set forth in
the decisions applies to all forms of unlawful harassment."); see also Richardson v. New York State
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physical, or visual, that has the purpose or effect of unreasonably inter-
fering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive working environment. Though a hostile work envi-
ronment need not cause psychological, economic, or other tangible injury
to be actionable,66 it must be "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter
the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive work-
ing environment."' 67
The "severe or pervasive" standard is easy to articulate but difficult
to apply.68 Using an intensively fact-laden analysis, courts assess the to-
tality of the circumstances, paying particular attention to the " 'frequency
of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threat-
ening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unrea-
sonably interferes with an employee's work performance."'' 69 Severity
and pervasiveness tend to be inversely related.70 That is, where the har-
assment is comprised of one or a few isolated incidents that are quite se-
vere-such as a sexual assault or other offensive touching-a hostile en-
Dep't of Correctional Servs., 180 F.3d 426, 436 (2d Cir. 1999) (Faragher and Ellerth standards ap-
ply to race); Allen v. Michigan Dep't of Corrections, 165 F.3d 405, 410 (6th Cir. 1999) (race);
Breeding v. Gallagher, 164 F.3d 1151, 1158 (8th Cir. 1999) (age); Wright-Simmons v. City of
Oklahoma City, 155 F.3d 1264, 1270 (10th Cir. 1998) (race); Wallin v. Minnesota Dep't of Correc-
tions, 153 F.3d 681, 687 (8th Cir. 1998) (assuming without deciding that Faragher applies to claims
brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act); Guzman v. Abbott Labs., 59 F Supp. 2d 747,
762 (N.D. 111. 1999) (national origin); Underwood v. Northport Health Servs., 57 F. Supp. 2d 1289,
1303 (M.D. Ala. 1999) (race).
66. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993).
67. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (quoting Henson v. Dundee,
682 F2d 897, 904 (1 1th Cir. 1982)); see also Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22 (stating that a sexually ob-
jectionable environment must be both objectively and subjectively offensive); Faragher. 524 U.S. at
788 (mandating that the "standards for judging hostility are sufficiently demanding to ensure that Ti-
tle VII does not become a 'general civility code"'); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523
U.S. 75, 81 (1998) (stating that Title VII does not prohibit "genuine but innocuous differences in the
ways men and women routinely interact with members of the same and of opposite sex"); BARBARA
LINDEMANN & DANIEL KADUE. SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 175 (1992) (noting that
these standards exclude "the ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such as the sporadic use of abu-
sive language, gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing").
68. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 786 (citing Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 and Henson, 682 F.2d at 904).
69. Id. at 787 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 23).
70. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991) ("[Tlhe required showing of
severity or seriousness of the harassing conduct varies inversely with the pervasiveness or frequency
of the conduct."); Carrero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 578 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding
that a plaintiff need not subject herself to lengthy abuse in order to recover for a hostile environ-
ment); EEOC v. A. Sam & Sons Produce, Co., 872 F. Supp. 29, 35 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) ("In other
words, infrequency, while relevant, is not alone dispositive. Rather, it is inversely related to the se-
verity of the incidents. ... ); Canada v. Boyd Group Inc., 809 F Supp. 771, 776 (D. Nev. 1992)
("The required showing of severity of conduct varies inversely with the required showing of fre-
quency of conduct.").
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vironment will mature long before the conduct becomes pervasive. 71 The
converse is also true: where the harassment manifests as a longstanding
pattern of conduct, no individual incident need be particularly severe in
order for the environment to be actionable.72 Either severe or pervasive
71. The EEOC has long held a single, severe act to be sufficient to create a hostile environ-
ment. See EEOC, Policy Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual Harassment, 8 F.E.P. Manual
405:6681, 6691 (Mar. 19, 1990) [hereinafter EEOC Policy Guidance] ("The Commission will pre-
sume that the unwelcome, intentional touching of a charging party's intimate body areas is suffi-
ciently offensive to alter the conditions of her working environment and constitute a violation of Ti-
tle VII .... If an employee's supervisor sexually touches that employee, the Commission normally
would find a violation."); see also Watkins v. Professional Sec. Bureau, Ltd., No. 98-2555, 1999
U.S. App. LEXIS 29841, at *11 (4th Cir. Nov. 15, 1999) (finding "little doubt" that rape by a su-
pervisor is sufficient to create an actionable hostile environment); Richardson v. New York State
Dep't of Correctional Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 437 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Tomka v. Seller Corp., 66
F.3d 1295, 1305 (2d Cir. 1995)) ("Our law is clear ... that 'even a single incident of sexual assault
sufficiently alters the conditions of the victim's employment and clearly creates an abusive work en-
vironment."'); Todd v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 175 F.3d 595, 599 (8th Cir. 1999) (Arnold, J., concur-
ring) ("I have no doubt that a single severe act of sexual harassment can amount to a hostile work
environment actionable under Title VII. I see nothing in Ellerth or Faragher to negative this pro-
position."); Creamer v. Laidlaw Transit Inc., 86 F.3d 167, 170 (10th Cir. 1996) ("[W~e agree, that an
employee may prevail . . . if there was only a single incident of harassment which, standing alone,
was sufficiently 'severe."'); Guess v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 913 F.2d 463, 464 (7th Cir. 1990)
(finding, impliedly, that a single incident where a supervisor picked up plaintiff and forced her face
against his crotch created a hostile environment); Grozdanich v. Leisure Hills Health Ctr., 25 F.
Supp. 2d 953, 970-71 (D. Minn. 1998) (recognizing that sexual assaults, though few or one in num-
ber, may rise to the level of a hostile environment); Fall v. Ind. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 12 F Supp.
2d 870, 879 (N.D. Ind. 1998) (finding that a single assault, involving a groping of intimate areas,
may create a hostile environment); Russell v. Midwest-Wemer & Pfleiderer, Inc., 949 F Supp. 792,
797 (D. Kan. 1996) (quoting Creamer, 86 F3d at 170) ('An employee may prevail in an action for
sexual harassment ... if there was only a single incident of harassment which, standing alone, was
sufficiently severe."'); Bedford v. Southeastern Pa. Transit Auth., 867 F. Supp. 288, 297 (E.D. Pa.
1994) ("[A] single act of harassment because of sex may be sufficient to sustain a hostile environ-
ment claim if ... it may reasonably be said to characterize the atmosphere in which a plaintiff must
work."); Campbell v. Kan. State Univ., 780 F. Supp. 755, 762 (D. Kan. 1991) ("As such, a single
isolated incident-while perhaps not pervasive-may nevertheless be so severe as to amount to an
actionable violation of Title VII."); see also Gloria Allred & John S. West, Sexual Harassment,
NAT'L L.J., Oct. 26, 1998, at B12 (arguing that Harris, Meritor, and Faragher "do not support the
proposition that a single incident of sexual harassment is insufficient to support a Title VII claim").
But see Clayton v. White Hall Sch. Dist., 875 F.2d 676, 680 (8th Cir. 1989) (finding a single inci-
dent of racial harassment insufficient, as a matter of law, to create a hostile environment); Gilbert v.
City of Little Rock, 722 F.2d 1390, 1394 (8th Cir. 1983) ("More than a few isolated incidents of
harassment must have occurred to establish a violation of Title VII."); Jones v. Clinton, 990 F Supp.
657, 675 (E.D. Ark. 1998) (suggesting that only in an exceptional case, such as a sexual assault,
could a single incident comprise an actionable hostile environment). Although one other court has
questioned whether a single, severe act could constitute a hostile environment, it did so based solely
on its view that an unfair rule of liability would attach based on the characterization. See Todd v.
Ortho Biotech, Inc., 175 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 1999).
72. Professor Vicki Schultz has pointed out the misguided tendency of courts to disaggregate
multiple non-severe incidents in order to find that no hostile environment existed. See Schultz, supra
note 9, at 1720.
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harassment can be actionable using the totality of the circumstances test
reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Harris v. Forklift Systems and
Faragher.13
B. New Standards for Employer Liability
Pleading an "actionable" claim of sexual harassment is only half
the battle-the other half is determining whether someone can be held li-
able for the harassment. Because individual harassers can generally not
be held liable under Title VII, 74 this inquiry usually centers on employer
liability.
As Meritor dictated, courts developed standards for employer liabil-
ity based on "agency principles. ' 75 Most began-and often finished-
their analysis with the Second Restatement of Agency, said to embody
the common law of agency. Section 219 of the Restatement, which in
this context has engendered great confusion, provides in relevant part:
(1) A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed while act-
ing in the scope of their employment.
(2) A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting outside
the scope of their employment, unless:
(a) the master intended the conduct or the consequences, or
(b) the master was negligent or reckless, or
(d) the servant . . . was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of
the agency relation.
76
Armed with section 219, courts began to develop rules of employer
liability for sexual harassment. Although some common threads emerged,
the rules of employer liability varied circuit by circuit. In some circuits,
employers could be held automatically liable for all supervisor harass-
73. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787 (listing frequency and severity as two factors to consider in
evaluating whether a hostile environment is actionable); Harris, 510 U.S. at 23 (suggesting that fre-
quency is one factor that may be considered under Meritor's totality of the circumstances test).
74. See Lissau v. Southern Food Serv., Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 180 (4th Cir. 1998); Haynes v. Wil-
liams, 88 F.3d 898, 899 (10th Cir. 1996); Williams v. Banning, 72 F3d 552, 555 (7th Cir. 1995);
Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313 (2d Cir. 1995); Greenlaw v. Garrett, 59 F.3d 994, 1001
(9th Cir. 1995); Cross v. Alabama, 49 F.3d 1490, 1504 (1Ith Cir. 1995). But see York v. Tennessee
Crushed Stone Ass'n, 684 F.2d 360, 362 (6th Cir. 1982) (holding an executive director liable in his
official capacity under Title VII).
75. See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
76. RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1957); see also id. § 219 cmt. 3e (enumerating
the situations in which a master may be held liable for the torts of his servants acting outside the
scope of employment).
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ment;77 in others, they could only be liable for supervisor harassment of
which they had notice. 78 In some circuits, employers could be insulated
from liability simply by enacting an anti-harassment policy; 79 in others, a
policy had little or no impact on liability.80 Even where courts agreed on
the ultimate rules of liability, their reasoning was often at odds.8'
After abstaining for more than a decade, the Supreme Court finally
took on the issue of employer liability in Faragher and Ellerth. In El-
lerth, the Court addressed the standard of liability for a subordinate em-
ployee subjected to unfulfilled threats. 82 In Faragher, the Court examined
the standard of liability for a supervisor-created hostile environment. 83
With those decisions, the Court resolved the bulk of the lower court con-
flicts and provided some bright line rules of liability, rooted in the Sec-
ond Restatement of Agency and adapted to the Title VII context.8 4 In the
course of deciding the cases before it, the Court reviewed the entire body
of law related to employer liability for sexual harassment, noting with
approval those rules it viewed as having "continuing vitality."85
The remainder of this section outlines the circumstances under
which employers can now be held directly or vicariously liable for sexual
harassment by supervisors or co-workers, considering the rules explicitly
established by the Court's recent decisions, as well as preexisting ones it
left intact.
77. See, e.g., Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 780 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that an
employer is strictly liable for a supervisor's work environment harassment if the supervisor was
"aided in accomplishing the harassment by the existence of the agency relationship," whether it be
with actual or apparent authority); Sauers v. Salt Lake County, I E3d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir. 1993)
(holding that an employer will be liable for supervisor harassment without regard to knowledge or
recklessness in hostile work environment cases).
78. See, e.g., Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1486 (3d Cir. 1990) (finding
employer liability for supervisor work environment harassment where the employer had or should
have had notice of such harassment); Pfau v. Reed, 125 F.3d 927, 936-37 (5th Cir. 1997); Perry v.
Harris Chemin, Inc., 126 F.3d 1010, 1013 (7th Cir. 1997); Callanan v. Runyun, 75 F3d 1293, 1296
(8th Cir. 1996); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F2d 897, 910 (1lth Cir. 1982).
79. See, e.g., Gary v. Long, 59 F3d 1391, 1400 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (refusing to hold employer
liable based on existence of anti-harassment policy and grievance procedure).
80. See, e.g., Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F3d 773, 780 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding employers
automatically liable regardless of the existence of an anti-harassment policy).
81. Compare id. (grounding liability in 219(2)(d)), with Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630,
636 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding employers liable for supervisor harassment based on scope of employ-
ment analysis).
82. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754 (1998).
83. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 804 (1998).
84. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 804; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762-63.
85. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 790-91.
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1. Direct Liability
a. "The master intended the conduct or the consequences"
Under section 219(2)(a) of the Restatement, an employer may be
held liable for sexual harassment where the individual charged with cre-
ating the hostile environment holds a sufficiently high position in the
management of the organization to be treated as the employer's proxy or
alter ego, such as the president or owner of a company.8 6 The Court in
Faragher noted this rule with approval." But as with the 'scope of em-
ployment theory, discussed below, this theory of liability applies as a
practical matter in very few cases.
b. "The master was negligent or reckless"
Before Faragher and Ellerth, all courts agreed that employers could
fairly be held liable for workplace sexual harassment under a negligence
theory.88 Section 219(2)(b) of the Restatement, which permits liability
when the "master was negligent or reckless," supports this approach.89
This theory of liability can be used where the hostile work environment
is created by coworkers, clients, customers, and other third parties as
well as supervisors. Meritor firmly established that employers have a
duty to maintain a nondiscriminatory environment, and that liability at-
86. See id. at 801-02; see also Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 991-92 (ist Cir. 1997)
(holding that an individual with an ownership interest in the organization who receives compensation
based on profits and participates in organization management would qualify as an "owner" for pur-
poses of alter ego liability); Torres v. Pisano, 116 E3d 625, 634-35 and n.I I (2d Cir. 1997) (holding
that the actions of a "sufficiently" high level supervisor may be imputed automatically to the em-
ployer); Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 955 F.2d 559, 566 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding an em-
ployer-company liable where harassment was perpetrated by its owner); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251,
255 (4th Cir. 1983) (requiring that an employee "demonstrate the propriety" of employer liability
"[e]xcept in situations where a proprietor, partner or corporate officer participates personally in the
harassing behavior.")
87. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 789 ("Nor was it exceptional that standards for binding the em-
ployer were not in issue in [Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993)]. In that case of dis-
crimination by hostile environment, the individual charged with creating the abusive atmosphere was
the president of the corporate employer, . . . who was indisputably within that class of an employer
organization's officials who may be treated as the organization's proxy."); see also Harrison v. Eddy
Potash, Inc., 158 F.3d 1371, 1376 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 758) ("[Tl]he Su-
preme Court in [Ellerth] acknowledged an employer can be held vicariously liable under Title VII if
the harassing employee's 'high rank in the company makes him or her the employer's alter ego."').
88. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 799 (noting that lower courts have "uniformly judg[ed] em-
ployer liability for co-worker harassment under a negligence standard"); see also 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.11(d) (1997); EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 71.
89. See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986).
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taches when that duty is breached ° Breach in this context translates to
notice and a concomitant failure to act. Employers with actual or con-
structive notice of a sexually hostile environment can thus be held di-
rectly liable unless they take prompt and effective remedial action. 9'
Employers most commonly acquire actual knowledge through direct
observation, or a victim's internal complaint or protest. 92 Employers will
also be directly liable for failing to take action to remedy a sexually hos-
tile environment about which they should have known.93 While the stan-
dard for constructive notice is hard to pin down, employers will certainly
be charged with knowledge of anything that is commonly known among
employees or that occurs pervasively in public work space. 94 It is at least
arguable that the failure to have a reasonable harassment policy may suf-
fice as proof of constructive notice of all harassment in the workplace. 95
90. See id. at 63-68.
91. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 759 (1998) ("[A]n employer can be
held liable ...where its own negligence is a cause of the harassment. An employer is negligent
with respect to sexual harassment if it knew or should have known about the conduct and failed to
stop it."); see also Baker v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 903 F.2d 1342, 1348 (10th Cir. 1990) (finding liabil-
ity where defendant "permitted known sex maniac to run amok in the workplace").
92. See, e.g., EEOC v. Murphy Motor Freight Lines, 488 F. Supp. 381, 385-86 (D. Minn.
1980) (finding actual notice of racial harassment where supervisory personnel saw derogatory notice
placed on bulletin board and racial slurs placed on equipment). Where complaints are made to a su-
pervisor or individual with sufficient authority, courts are likely to impute that knowledge to the
company generally. See Williams v. City of Houston, 148 F3d 462, 467 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding no-
tice sufficient where complaint made to "first-line supervisor" rather than "upper management");
Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 637 (2d Cir. 1997) ("(W]here the person who gained notice of the
harassment was the supervisor of the harasser ...knowledge will be imputed to the employer.");
Bayard v. Riccitelli, 952 F. Supp. 977, 986 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding notice where plaintiff com-
plained to immediate supervisor); Wimberly v. Shoney's, Inc., 39 EE.P. Cases 444, 453 (S.D. Ga.
1985) (finding actual notice based on complaint to area manager and area training supervisor). But
see Whitmore v. O'Connor Management, Inc., 156 F.3d 796, 802 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding notice in-
sufficient where complaint made to head of maintenance because individual was not part of the em-
ployer's management).
93. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
94. See Splunge v. Shoney's, Inc., 97 F.3d 488, 490 (1 Ith Cir. 1996) (charging an employer
with constructive notice and triggering its duty to take corrective action where harassment was suffi-
ciently pervasive); Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1016, 1018 (8th Cir. 1988) (charging em-
ployer with constructive notice where incidents were "so numerous" that the employer would have
had to know of them"); Fall v. Indiana Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 12 F. Supp. 2d 870, 882 (N.D. Ind.
1998) (finding that an employer had constructive knowledge where harassment by supervisors "was
so broad in scope, and so permeated the workplace, that it must have come to the attention of some-
one authorized to do something about it"); Smith v. Sheahan, No. 95-C7230, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20753, at *27 (N.D. Ill.) (finding that knowledge of employer can be inferred where harassment is
"particularly pervasive").
95. See, e.g., Perry v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 115 F3d 143, 149 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Karibian v.
Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 777, 780 (2d Cir. 1994)) ("When harassment is perpetrated by the plain-
tiff's coworkers, an employer will be liable if the plaintiff demonstrates that 'the employer either
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In short, the Court confirmed in Ellerth and Faragher that actual or
constructive knowledge of past or ongoing harassment triggers an em-
ployer's duty to investigate, take action to remedy the harassment, and
prevent its reoccurrence. Failure to take such steps may give rise to lia-
bility under Title VII for the harassment. 96 But negligence simply sets a
"minimum standard for employer liability." 97 An employer without ac-
tual or constructive notice of sexual harassment is not immune from suit;
it may still be held liable under a theory of vicarious liability.
2. Vicarious Liability
a. Scope of Employment
Without question, employers are vicariously liable for any action
taken by an employee within the scope of employment regardless of no-
tice. This principle comes without modification from section 219(1) of
the Second Restatement.98 Not all conduct that occurs during employ-
ment, however, is within the scope of employment. For an employee's
conduct to fall within his "scope of employment" it must be "actuated,
at least in part, by a purpose to serve the [employer]." 99 Behavior consti-
tuting sexual harassment seldom meets that test; to the contrary, the
"harassing supervisor often acts for personal motives, motives unrelated
and even antithetical to the objectives of the employer." "0 Thus, the Su-
preme Court in Ellerth took note of a "general rule ...that sexual har-
assment by a supervisor is not conduct within the scope of
provided no reasonable avenue for complaint or knew of the harassment but did nothing about it' "),
cited in Faragher, 524 U.S. at 799; see also EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 71 (The EEOC will
generally "find an employer liable ...when the employer failed to establish an explicit policy
against sexual harassment and did not have a reasonably available avenue by which victims of sex-
ual harassment could complain to someone with authority to investigate and remedy the problem").
96. See Ellerih, 524 U.S. at 759; see also Faragher, 524 U.S. at 789 ("[T]he combined
knowledge and inaction [of employers] may be seen as demonstrable negligence.").
97. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 759.
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1957) ("A master is subject to liability for
the torts of his servants committed while acting in the scope of their employment."). The "scope of
employment" theory, if applicable, is the only basis upon which to hold an employer vicariously lia-
ble for harassment committed by a non-supervisor, or by a supervisor over a non-subordinate em-
ployee. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 804. But most liability for co-worker harassment is premised on a
theory of direct liability-liability for the employer's own negligence. See id. (collecting cases).
99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228(l)(c) (1957).
100. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 757; see also Faragher, 524 U.S. at 793 ("Courts of Appeals have
typically held, or assumed, that conduct similar to the subject of this complaint falls outside the
scope of employment.").
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employment." 10'
b. Outside the Scope of Employment: "[T]he servant...
was aided ... by the existence of the agency relation"
Employers are not immune from liability simply because their super-
visory employees harass subordinate employees outside the scope of em-
ployment. Section 219(2) of the Restatement of Agency provides several
additional bases for holding employers liable for harassment by supervi-
sors even when they are acting outside the scope of employment.' ° Ulti-
mately, the Supreme Court in both Ellerth and Faragher focused on sub-
section 219(2)(d), 10 3 which permits master liability when the servant is
aided by the agency relation. i°4 In the Title VII context, the crucial part
of the inquiry is determining when a supervisor is "aided" in his harass-
ing conduct by the "agency relation."' 15 This question had caused much
dissension among lower courts and commentators, and the Court's analy-
sis provided some much needed clarification.
(1) Harassment Resulting in Tangible Employment Action
In tangible employment action cases, assessing employer liability
under section 219(d) is relatively simple: the employer is automatically
liable when its supervisor actually exercises authority to fire or otherwise
tangibly harm a subordinate employee who fails to submit to the supervi-
sor's sexual advances. In this "class of cases ... more than the mere ex-
istence of the employment relation aids in commission of the harass-
ment. . . ."0 For Title VII purposes, a "supervisor" is anyone with the
actual or apparent authority'017 to affect the hiring, firing, demotion, eval-
101. 524 U.S. at 757; see also Faragher, 524 U.S. at 801. There are, as the Court, in Ellerth
noted, unusual circumstances where a supervisor's harassing behavior may actually be motivated by
or in furtherance of an employer's policy. See 524 U.S. at 757 (citing Sims v. Montgomery County
Comm'n, 766 F. Supp. 1052, 1075 (M.D. Ala. 1990) (finding supervisor's harassment to be in fur-
therance of employer's policy of discouraging women from seeking advancement)). Vicarious liabil-
ity is clearly valid in such a situation.
102. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) (1957).
103. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 801-02; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 757-64.
104. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (1957).
105. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 802.
106. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760.
107. The Court in Ellerth considered and dismissed the principle of apparent authority as
largely irrelevant in the context of sexual harassment. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 759. It would be ap-
plicable, the Court said, only if an employee reasonably misperceived an harassing employee to have
supervisory authority. See id. ("If, in the unusual case, it is alleged that there is a false impression
that the actor was a supervisor, when in fact he was not, the victim's mistaken conclusion must be a
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uation, or daily working conditions of another employee. 08 The supervi-
sor who actually exercises that authority to the detriment of a subordinate
employee is clearly aided by the agency relation in accomplishing his
harassment, as he could not fulfill the threat without the benefit of that
relationship. Thus, the Court in Ellerth concluded,
[A] tangible employment action taken by the supervisor becomes for Title VII pur-
poses the act of the employer. Whatever the exact contours of the aided in the
agency relation standard, its requirements will always be met when a supervisor
takes a tangible employment action against a subordinate. In that instance, it would
be implausible to interpret agency principles to allow an employer to escape
liability .... 109
Based on this reasoning, the Court adopted a rule of automatic liability,
further described below, when supervisor harassment results in a tangible
employment action"0 against the subordinate employee."'
reasonable one."); see also Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1247 n.20 (1lth
Cir. 1998) ("Although the employer may argue that the employee had no actual authority to take the
employment action against the plaintiff, apparent authority serves just as well to impute liability to
the employer for the employee's action."). But because an employee with apparent but no actual au-
thority could not take any tangible employment action against another employee, this rule is only ap-
plicable in the context of hostile environment harassment. See infra text accompanying notes 117-25.
108. For varying definitions of supervisor, see, for example, Grozdanich v. Leisure Hills
Health Center, 25 F. Supp. 2d 953, 972-73 (D. Minn. 1998) (-[Ilt is evident that the Supreme Court
views the term 'supervisor' as more expansive than as merely including those employees whose
opinions are dispositive on hiring, firing, and promotion." It also includes an employee whose "au-
thority extended only to the management of his subordinates' daily activities and .. . routines."); see
also Parkins v. Civil Constructors of Ill., Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 1034 (7th Cir. 1998) ("[Tihe essence
of supervisory status is the authority to ... hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline an em-
ployee."); Kent v. Henderson, No. 99-1585, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18609, at *9-10 (E.D. Pa. Nov.
30, 1999) (discussing varying definitions of supervisor for sexual harassment purposes); Simon v.
City of Naperville, No. 98C5263, 2000 WL 283107, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2000) ("[A] person as-
signed to train new recruits and make recommendations that affect their future employment status
obviously has authority that affects terms and conditions of employment."); Jackson v. T & N
Servs., No. CIVA-99-1267, 200 WL 264131, at *4-5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 2000) ("[T]he limited liability
of employees to direct the work of crews or other small groups of workers does not equate to a su-
pervisory position for purposes of imputing liability to the employer.").
109. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762-63. This position was foreshadowed by Meritor, in which the
Court noted the following EEOC argument with approval: "where a supervisor exercises the author-
ity actually delegated to him by his employer, by making or threatening to make decisions affecting
the employment status of his subordinates, such actions are properly imputed to the employer whose
delegation of authority empowered the supervisor to undertake them." Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 70-71 (1986) ("Courts have consistently held employers liable for the discrimi-
natory discharges of employees by supervisory personnel, whether or not the employer knew, should
have known, or approved of the supervisor's actions.").
110. As with the threshold question of discrimination, the question of whether favorable em-
ployment actions based on an employee's submission to sexual advances should be treated like tangi-
ble job detriment cases for liability purposes is an open question. The EEOC's position is that ful-
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(2) Harassment Not Resulting in Tangible Employment
Action
This leaves the question of what happens when the harassment does
not culminate in a tangible employment action. When is a supervisor
who does not take tangible employment action against an employee suffi-
ciently "aided by the agency relation" to justify vicarious liability for the
employer? This question was explored in Faragher when the Court ex-
amined the means by which a supervisor who creates a hostile environ-
ment is typically aided by agency relation."12 The supervisor-subordinate
employment relationship affords the supervisor contact with the harassed
employee, creates a captive audience for the harasser, makes conduct
more threatening, makes the employee more reluctant to resist or com-
plain, prevents the employee from dealing with abuse in same way as
with co-worker, and supports an implicit threat of sanctions for
complaining." '3
The Court then considered the possible rules for dealing with super-
visor harassment that does not culminate in a tangible employment ac-
tion." 4 One possibility is to hold that supervisors are always aided by the
agency relation and apply the same rule of automatic liability applicable
to cases involving a tangible employment action." '" A significant obstacle
to that rule, however, is that under its own interpretation of Meritor, the
Court could not adopt a pure rule of automatic liability without overrul-
ing it." 6 At the other end of the spectrum would be a rule requiring each
filled threat and submission cases are indistinguishable in this context also:
It would be a perverse result if the employer is foreclosed from raising the affirmative de-
fense if its supervisor denies a tangible job benefit based on an employee's rejection of un-
welcome sexual demands, but can raise the defense if its supervisor grants a tangible job ben-
efit based on submission to such demands . . . . In both those situations the supervisor
undertakes a tangible employment action on a discriminatory basis.
EEOC Revised Policy Guidance, supra note 53.
11. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 790. The court in Faragher acknowledged the consensus on
automatic liability in this situation, noting that "there is nothing remarkable in the fact that claims
against employers for discriminatory employment actions with tangible results, like hiring, firing,
promotion, compensation, and work assignment, have resulted in employer liability once the discrim-
ination was shown." Id. The court also excluded quid pro quo cases from its general rule allowing
employers to avoid liability by mounting the affirmative defense discussed below. See id. at 808
("No affirmative defense is available, however, when the supervisor's harassment culminates in a
tangible employment action, such as discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment.").
112. See id. at 802.
113. See id. at 803.
114. See id. at 793-810.
115. See id. at 802.
116. See id. at 792, 804 (noting the holding in Meritor that "Title VII does not make employ-
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individual plaintiff to prove that the supervisor was in fact aided by the
agency relation in accomplishing the sexual harassment at issue."17 But
such a rule, the Court wisely concluded, would result in unnecessary un-
certainty and costly litigation for both plaintiffs and defendants." 8
Rather than landing at either end of this spectrum, the Court staked
out a middle ground by adopting a rule of automatic liability that is sub-
ject to an affirmative defense." 9 As a general matter, an employer is sub-
ject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable hos-
tile environment created by a supervisor that has authority over the
employee. However,
[w]hen no tangible employment action is taken, a defending employer may raise an
affirmative defense to liability or damages, subject to proof by a preponderance of
the evidence. The defense comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer
exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing
behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage
of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer to avoid
harm otherwise.'20
ers always automatically liable for sexual harassment by supervisors") (citations omitted).
117. See id. at 804 ("There is certainly some authority for requiring active or affirmative, as
distinct from passive or implicit, misuse of supervisory authority before liability may be imputed.").
118. See id. at 805.
119. See id. at 807. Ironically, Justice Thomas dissented from the Court's opinion in both
Faragher and Ellerth, largely because he believes that this standard is more stringent than the stan-
dard for comparable racial harassment. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 766-67; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 810.
The analysis in his dissent is insupportable, however. The cases cited therein follow a negligence
standard of liability for racial harassment because they involve co-workers rather than supervisors.
See, e.g., Dennis v. County of Fairfax, 55 F.3d 151, 155 (4th Cir. 1995) (applying negligence stan-
dard to claim of racial harassment by co-worker); Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 858 F.2d 345, 349
(6th Cir. 1988) ("In order to hold the employer liable for the conduct of the victim's co-workers, the
plaintiff must establish that the employer knew or should have known of the alleged conduct and
failed to take prompt remedial action.") (emphasis added); Snell v. Suffolk County, 782 F.2d 1094,
1104 (2d Cir. 1986) (adopting standard articulated in DeGrace); DeGrace v. Rumsfeld, 614 F.2d 796,
805 (1st Cir. 1980) ("[A]n employer who has taken reasonable steps under the circumstances to cor-
rect and/or prevent racial harassment by its nonsupervisory personnel has not violated Title VIL.")
(emphasis added). The same rule applies for sexual harassment by co-workers: an employer is liable
for a hostile environment created by co-workers only if it knew or should have known of the harass-
ment. See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text. The Court's decisions in Faragher and Ellerth,
which address the question when a supervisor is aided by the agency relation in accomplishing har-
assment, have no bearing on the standard of liability for co-worker harassment. See Ellerth, 524 U.S.
at 762. Indeed, every court considering the standard of liability for other forms of unlawful harass-
ment in the wake of Faragher and Ellerth has adopted the standard without modification. See supra
note 67.
120. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807 (citation omitted); Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765 (citation omitted).
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This compromise position of adding an affirmative defense is perhaps the
most significant aspect of the Court's decisions, one that merits careful
analysis.
C. Understanding the Affirmative Defense
The affirmative defense is only available in hostile environment
cases. 121 To use it successfully, an employer bears the burden of proving
both prongs of a two-part defense.
1. The First Prong
The first prong is within the employer's exclusive control and re-
quires the employer to take reasonable care both to prevent and correct
sexual harassment. 22
a. "To prevent. . . any sexually harassing behavior'' 3
"Reasonable care" in the context of prevention requires an em-
ployer to enact, distribute, and enforce an anti-harassment policy that is
calculated to encourage victims to come forward with complaints of un-
welcome sexual conduct and to respond effectively to their complaints. 24
Substantively, a reasonable policy will communicate the employer's de-
sire to maintain a harassment-free working environment, inform employ-
121. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
122. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. An employer who takes the
steps necessary to guarantee success on the first prong of the affirmative defense is rewarded not
only by avoiding liability in some cases, but also by avoiding punitive damages in all cases. The Su-
preme Court's recent decision in Kolstad v. American Dental Association clarified when employers
may he forced to pay punitive damages for intentional discrimination. 119 S. Ct. 2118 (1999). In
Kolstad, the Court determined that punitive damages may not be imposed where liability is vicarious
based on the acts of a supervisor or agent whose conduct is contrary to the employer's efforts to
comply with Title VII. See id. at 2129. Thus, although an employer who enacts an anti-harassment
policy, trains its employees, and maintains an effective grievance procedure may still face liability
for a supervisor's harassment if the victim complains (thereby depriving the employer of the affirma-
tive defense), that same employer would likely be immune from a punitive damages award.
123. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
124. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807 (noting that "a stated policy suitable to the employment
circumstances" will often be important to litigation over the first prong of the defense). Cf. Meritor,
477 U.S. at 73 (noting that defendant's contention that policy could insulate employer from liability
"might be substantially stronger if its procedures were better calculated to encourage victims of har-
assment to come forward"); 29 C.F.R. 1604.1 1(f) (1998) (encouraging employers to "take all steps
necessary to prevent sexual harassment from occurring, such as affirmatively raising the subject, ex-
pressing strong disapproval, developing appropriate sanctions, informing employees of their rights to
raise and how to raise the issue of harassment under Title VII, and developing methods to sensitize
all concerned").
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ees about their rights, define prohibited conduct, promise confidentiality
to the extent practicable, sternly prohibit retaliation against any employee
who makes a complaint under the policy, and provide a viable mecha-
nism for reporting and resolving complaints of sexual harassment. 12 5
Adequate dissemination of a sexual harassment policy is as impor-
tant as its content for purposes of the affirmative defense. That is, to be
an effective tool of prevention, a sexual harassment policy must be
widely circulated and well-known among employees. Lack of dissemina-
tion was critical to the Court's decision to impose liability against the
city in Faragher.2 6 Although the city had a sexual harassment policy, it
had never been distributed to the employees in the Marine Safety Section
in which Faragher and her harassing supervisors worked. 27 Reasonable
care to prevent harassment may also require employers to offer employ-
ees training sessions about the new policy and procedures or about sex-
ual harassment in general. 2
125. See, e.g., Miller v. Woodharbor Molding & Millworks, Inc., 80 F. Supp. 2d 1026 (N.D.
Iowa 2000) (finding policy inadequate in part because it failed to expressly prohibit retaliation); Col-
lins v. Village of Woodridge, No. 95C6097, 2000 WL 294071, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 17, 2000) (dis-
cussing the importance of a confidentiality clause in a harassment policy and the employer's adher-
ence to that clause); Smith v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 247 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding
sexual harassment policy inadequate in part because it did not address discrimination on the basis of
gender); Wilson v. Tulsa Junior College, 164 F.3d 534, 541 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding policy inade-
quate in part because it permitted employees to bypass the harassing supervisor by complaining to
the director of personnel services, who was inaccessible to employees). But see Ritchie v. Stamler
Corp., No. 98-5750, 2000 WL 84461, at *3 (6h Cir. Jan. 12, 2000) (finding summary judgment in
favor of employer proper where employer's policy required all complaints to be submitted in writing
to the president of the corporation).
126. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808.
127. See id. The Court observed:
While the City would have an opportunity to raise an affirmative defense if there were any
serious prospect of its presenting one, it appears from the record that any such avenue is
closed. The District Court found that the City had entirely failed to disseminate its policy
against sexual harassment among the beach employees....
Id.; see also Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dep't, 174 F.3d 95, 118 (3d Cir. 1999) (rejecting em-
ployer's claim to affirmative defense based, in part, on its failure to disseminate or enforce its anti-
harassment policy); Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 158 F.3d 1371, 1377 (10th Cir. 1998) (reversing
summary judgment for employer based on failure to establish that plaintiff had been made aware of
harassment policy); Booker v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., 17 F Supp. 2d 735, 747 (M.D. Tenn. 1998)
(denying employer's motion for summary judgment based on the affirmative defense partially be-
cause there was a lack of proof that a policy had ever been distributed); Miller, 80 F. Supp. 2d at
1030 (holding that prevention was inadequate in part because supervisors were not made aware of
employer's anti-harassment policy).
128. See, e.g., Shaw v. Autozone Inc., 180 F.3d 806, 812-13 (7th Cir. 1999) (counting training
of managers as one factor supporting summary judgment for employer based on affirmative defense).
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b. "To . . . correct any sexually harassing behavior'1 29
The first prong also requires that the employer take appropriate cor-
rective action. An analysis of what constitutes "reasonable care to . . .
correct any sexually harassing behavior" focuses primarily on available
complaint mechanisms and employer response to complaints.130
Where the employer has notice of harassment, reasonable care re-
quires that it takes adequate steps to remedy it.' 3' Because of this duty to
respond, employers cannot distinguish between informal and formal com-
plaints; they cannot agree-even at the victim's request to-look the
other way.'32 To discharge its duty, an employer must investigate allega-
tions of harassment and "take immediate and appropriate corrective ac-
tion by doing whatever is necessary to end the harassment, make the vic-
tim whole by restoring lost employment benefits or opportunities, and
prevent the misconduct from recurring."' 33 A response that is either pro-
cedurally or substantively inadequate will deprive the employer of the
opportunity to rely on the affirmative defense. Indispensable to a legally
adequate response is a prompt 34 and thorough investigation, coupled with
129. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
130. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
131. See Miller, 80 F Supp. 2d at 1031-32; EEOC Revised Policy Guidance, supra note 52, at
E-32.
132. See, e.g., Wilson v. Tulsa Junior College, 164 F.3d 534, 541 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding
complaint process deficient because it only requires supervisors to report formal complaints); EEOC
Revised Policy Guidance, supra note 52, at E-32 (suggesting that the prudent employer will not
honor a victim's request not to investigate); see also Varner v. National Super Mkt., Inc., 94 F.3d
1209, 1213-14 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding complaint procedure ineffective Where supervisor was not re-
quired to report known harassment to individuals with power to address it). But see Torres v. Pisano,
116 F.3d 625, 639 (2d Cir. 1997) (suggesting that employer may be able to honor victim's request
that no action be taken unless conduct alleged is particularly severe).
133. EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 71.
134. For cases assessing whether an employer responded with sufficient promptness, see, for
example, Van Zant v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 80 F.3d 708, 715 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding re-
sponses sufficiently prompt where investigation commenced on the day the complaint was made and
punitive action was taken against the harasser within ten days); Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co.,
25 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding response inadequate despite firing of harasser where in-
vestigation was not taken seriously nor action taken until victim filed complaint with the NERC);
Saxton v. AT&T Bell Lab., 10 F.3d 526, 535 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding employer response adequate
where investigation begun one day after complaint and detailed report was issued within two weeks);
Nash v. Electrospace Sys., Inc., 9 F.3d 401, 404 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding completion of the investiga-
tion within one week sufficiently prompt); Juarez v. Ameritech Mobile Communications, Inc., 957
F.2d 317, 319 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding that an adequate investigation was completed within four
days); Moland v. Bil-Mar Foods, 994 F Supp. 1061, 1074 (N.D. Iowa 1998) (finding a genuine issue
of fact whether employer responded promptly where remedial actions were taken only after repeated
complaints); Bayard v. Riccitelli, 952 F Supp. 977, 986 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding a genuine issue of
material fact as to the adequacy of an employer response when there is a two month delay between
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remedial action calculated to stop the harassment without punishing the
victim. 35 The failure to stop the harassment, however, is not necessarily
fatal to an employer's defense. 36
Where the employer does not have notice of a particular incident,
the measuring stick for reasonable care to correct harassment will neces-
sarily be backward-looking. For example, if an employer has failed to in-
vestigate harassment complaints, act on findings of harassment, or, worse
still, retaliated against complainants, future victims will have a strong ar-
gument that the policy and grievance procedure did not provide a "rea-
sonable avenue" for their complaints. Additionally, a policy may itself be
unreasonable if it requires an employee to report any harassment to an
immediate supervisor, without providing any alternative in case that su-
pervisor is causing or complicit in the harassment. 37 The fact that the
employer's policy "did not include any assurance that the harassing su-
pervisors could be bypassed in registering complaints" was relevant to
the Court's decision in Faragher that the employer could not succeed in
proving the first prong of the affirmative defense.
38
investigation and remedial measures).
135. For cases evaluating the substantive adequacy of an employer's remedial measures, see
generally Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1465 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding employer
response inadequate where employer twice changed victim's shift to avoid contact with supervisor
rather than alter his working conditions); Guess v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 913 F.2d 463, 465 (7th
Cir. 1990) ("A remedial measure that makes the victim of sexual harassment worse off is ineffective
per se.") (emphasis added); see also Jackson v. Quanex Corp., 191 F.3d 647, 665-67 (6th Cir. 1999)
(finding simple reprimand of harasser insufficient to permit proof of the affirmative defense); EEOC
Policy Guidance, supra note 71, at E-31 ("Remedial measures should not adversely affect the com-
plainant .... [I]f it is necessary to separate the parties, then the harasser should be transferred (un-
less the complainant prefers otherwise)."). For a general discussion of the interaction between disci-
pline taken under Title VII and employees' rights under collective bargaining agreements, see
Stephen Buehrer, Clash of the Titans: Judicial Deference to Arbitration and the Public Policy Excep-
tion in the Context of Sexual Harassment, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 265 (1998), and Estelle D.
Franklin, Maneuvering Through the Labyrinth: The Employers' Paradox in Responding to Hostile
Environment Sexual Harassment-A Proposed Way Out, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1517 (1999).
136. See, e.g., Savino v. C.P. Hall Co., No. 98-4257, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 32476, at *17
(7th Cir. Dec. 14, 1999).
137. See, e.g., Fowler v. Sunrise Carpet Indus., 911 F. Supp. 1560, 1582 (N.D. Ga. 1996)
(finding complaint process deficient where plaintiff required to report to harasser); cf. Wilson v.
Tulsa Junior College, 164 F.3d 534, 541 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding complaint process deficient be-
cause it permitted employees to bypass the harassing supervisor by complaining to director of per-
sonnel services, but the director was inaccessible due to hours of duty and location in a separate fa-
cility). But cf. Ritchie v. Stamler Corp., No. 98-5750, 2000 WL 84461, at *3 (6th Cir. Jan. 12, 2000)
(affirming summary judgment to employer despite the fact that harassment policy required com-
plaints to be reported in writing to company president, regardless of harasser's identity).
138. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808.
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2. The Second Prong
The second prong of the affirmative defense focuses on the conduct
of the victim. To prevail, an employer must prove that "the plaintiff em-
ployee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or correc-
tive opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm other-
wise."' 139 This prong calls for two questions to be answered: (1) whether
the plaintiff failed to complain or otherwise mitigate harm and, if so, (2)
whether her failure to do so was unreasonable. 4 0
How and when must a victim of a hostile work environment react to
harassment in order to preclude an employer's success on this prong of
the affirmative defense? Utilizing the employer's internal grievance pro-
cedure is the most common, though not the sole way for a plaintiff to
satisfy this prong of the affirmative defense.' 4' Rarely, if ever, will courts
excuse a plaintiff from filing an internal complaint due to fear of retalia-
tion or the perception that such complaints are futile. Courts have taken a
hard line on such allegations; one has held, as a matter of law, that
"generalized fears [of retaliation] can never constitute reasonable grounds
for an employee's failure to complain to his or her employer." 42
139. Id. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
140. An employer's control over this prong is limited to ensuring that its policies, procedures,
and employment culture are such that it would always be "unreasonable" for a plaintiff to bypass
the internal grievance procedures. However, this component of employer behavior is already ac-
counted for in the first prong, which evaluates the employer's policies, procedures, and penchant for
(or against) retaliation. For example, an employer would not be able to prevail on this second prong
if its policy required the plaintiff to report unwelcome conduct to the very supervisor perpetrating the
harassment, for it would be entirely reasonable for the plaintiff to refuse to use the employer's inter-
nal grievance mechanism and head straight for the courthouse. But that flaw in the policy would
have already precluded the employer from utilizing the affirmative defense under the preventative as-
pect of the first prong. Consequently, the proper analysis of the second prong turns exclusively on
the plaintiff's conduct.
141. See, e.g., Watts v. Kroger Co., 170 F.3d 505, 511 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding that plaintiff
made sufficient effort "to avoid harm otherwise" where she filed a union grievance instead of utiliz-
ing the employer's harassment complaint process).
142. Fierro v. Saks Fifth Ave., 13 F. Supp. 2d 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); see also Watkins v. Pro-
fessional Sec. Bureau, Ltd., No. 98-2555, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 29841, at 19-20 (4th Cir. Nov. 15,
1999) (holding evidence of plaintiff's failure to report harassment due to "embarrassment and fear of
reprisal" insufficient as a matter of law to justify inaction); Cardidad v. Metro-North Commuter
R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 295 (2d Cir. 1999) (reluctance of a victim to report harassing conduct "must be
based on apprehension of what the employer might do, not merely on concern about the reaction of
co-workers"); Shaw v. AutoZone, Inc., 180 F.3d 806, 813 (7th Cir. 1999) ("[Aln employee's subjec-
tive fears of confrontation, unpleasantness or retaliation do not alleviate the employee's duty under
Ellerth to alert the employer to the allegedly hostile environment."); Barrett v. Applied Radiant En-
ergy Corp., 70 F. Supp. 2d 644, 653 (W.D. Va. 1999) (neither subjective and generalized fears of re-
taliation nor speculative concerns about management inaction justify plaintiff's failure to complain);
Franklin v. Consolidated Edison, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 2286 (WHP), 1999 WL 796170, *8 (S.D.N.Y.
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Though the boundaries vary from case to case, courts have been
quick to hold that a delay in complaining can be just as fatal to a plain-
tiff's case as a total failure to complain. Courts have found delays as
short as three months to be unreasonable, 43 although the reasonableness
of the response time may vary with the type of harassment. For example,
with non-physical harassment, a reasonable employee may not immedi-
ately complain, but may only do so after a series of unwelcome com-
ments, advances, or gestures have occurred. 44
Sept. 30, 1999) (an employee is unreasonable when she merely asserts that she did not take advan-
tage of her employer's policy because she subjectively believed "there was no one to whom she
could complain"); Hylton v. Norrell Health Care, 53 F Supp. 2d 613, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("Gener-
alized fears such as 'I was afraid of repercussions' related to informing an employer of harassment
in the workplace do not constitute reasonable grounds for an employee's failure to raise a complaint
of harassment with his or her employer."); Hetreed v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 96-C2021, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7219 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (plaintiff's fear of retaliation, "even if credited, is not a valid rea-
son for not reporting the harassment for it prevents the defendant company from taking corrective
action"); Madray v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1375 (S.D. Fla. 1998) ("An em-
ployee's generalized fear of repercussions cannot form the basis for an employee's failure to com-
plain to his or her employer."); Jones v. USA Petroleum Corp., 20 F Supp. 2d 1379, 1386 (S.D. Ga.
1998) (a fear of repercussion justification for failure to complain was insufficient to withstand a mo-
tion for summary judgment); Montero v. AGCO Corp., 19 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1146 (E.D. Cal. 1998)
(employer may prove affirmative defense where "[p]laintiff has offered no evidence to support her
apparent belief that the policy would not be honored"); Sconce v. Tandy Corp., 9 F. Supp. 2d 773,
778 (W.D. Ky. 1998) ("[A] threat of termination, without more, is not enough to excuse an em-
ployee from following procedures adopted for her protection.").
143. See, e.g., Savino v. C.P. Hall Co., No. 98-4257, 1999 WL 1172892, *5 (7th Cir. Dec. 14,
1999) (finding that the employee failed to take advantage of opportunities to prevent or correct har-
assment when she did not complain about the harassment for four months and when she did report
it, she did not tell her employer about incidents of harassment that previously occurred); Phillips, 83
F Supp. 2d at 1034 (finding three month delay unreasonable under second prong of the affirmative
defense); Montero v. AGCO Corp., 192 F3d 856, 863 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the employer sat-
isfied the second prong of the affirmative defense where the employee was aware of the employer's
policy prohibiting sexual harassment but did not complain until almost two years after the alleged
harassment began); Alberter v. McDonald's Corp., 70 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1150 (D. Nev. 1999) (hold-
ing that a minor female employee (fifteen years old) working at a fast food restaurant behaved un-
reasonably, despite her age and "relative unfamiliarity with the adult workplace," by not notifying
her employer of sexual harassment until "some weeks" after she quit); Mirakhorli v. DFW Manage-
ment Co., No. 3:94-CV-1464-D, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9344, at *24 and *24 n.16 (N.D. Tex. May
24, 1999) (finding that employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of her employer's antiharass-
ment policy where her EEOC charge indicated the harassment commenced in August but she did not
inform her employer of the harassing conduct until October); Kohler v. Inter-Tel Tech., No. C98-
0378 (MJJ), 1999 WL 226208, at *5 (N.D. Cal. April 13, 1999) (holding that the "plaintiff acted
unreasonably by never reporting any harassment" until after she retained an attorney, quit her posi-
tion and found alternative employment, and further refused to cooperate in the investigation once the
employer became aware of the inappropriate conduct).
144. See, e.g., Corcoran v. Shoney's Colonial, Inc., 24 F Supp. 2d 601, 606 (W.D. Va. 1998)
("Though unwanted sexual remarks have no place in the work environment, it is far from uncom-
mon for those subjected to such remarks to ignore them when they are first made.")
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In one decision, Marsicano v. American Society of Safety Engi-
neers,145 the district court found a plaintiff's behavior unreasonable even
though she complained within two weeks of the onset of harassment. 146
The plaintiff in Marsicano suffered harassment from her direct supervi-
sor, Hatter, beginning on her first day of employment and continuing to
her last--eight working days later. 47 On her last day of employment, a
high-level manager, Neel, stopped by plaintiff's office and asked how
plaintiff was settling in. 148 Plaintiff did not raise any of her concerns
about the harassing supervisor during that conversation. 49 That afternoon
plaintiff was subjected to further harassment. 50 The next day, however,
she called and said she was unable to come to work and would not re-
turn to the company at all due to the harassment by her supervisor.'5'
The company offered her a different position where she would have less,
but still some contact with the harassing supervisor. Plaintiff refused and
sued. 52
Although the plaintiff properly availed herself of the complaint pro-
cedures outlined in the employee handbook, the district court held that
she had nonetheless behaved unreasonably for not mentioning Hatter's
conduct to her supervisor when asked how she was settling in. 53 "By re-
maining silent in these circumstances, Marsicano unreasonably failed to
take advantage of a corrective and, more importantly, preventive opportu-
nity provided by her employer."' 54 Although this case is extreme, other
courts have also measured victim reasonableness under the second prong
of the affirmative defense quite harshly.
II. THE NEW LAW OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT: As APPLIED
As is often true when the high court speaks on matters affecting
Americans' daily lives-and their pocketbooks-public reaction to the
decisions on employer liability have been mixed. Some employer-friendly
commentators praised the new rules for providing clear requirements 55
145. No. 97-C7819, 1998 WL 603128 (N.D. Il. Sept. 4, 1998).
146. See id. at *2, 8.
147. See id. at *2-3.




152. See id. at *4.
153. See id. at *8.
154. Id. at *7.
155. See, e.g., Michael Barrier, Sexual Harassment, NATION'S Bus., Dec. 1998 ("On the up-
side, the court clearly explained for the first time how employers can insulate themselves from many
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and rewarding diligent employers. 56 But most observers characterized the
Faragher/Ellerth scheme as a loss for employers because it failed to ex-
plicitly ratify the employer-urged rule permitting liability only for negli-
gence (i.e. where the employer knew or should have known about the
harassment and failed to stop it).1 7 As one commentator noted, "[in the
past, there was no ruling in place that required employers to be accounta-
ble for misconduct if they did not know that such misconduct was taking
place." 158
But a closer analysis of the new scheme and its application in the
two years since Faragher and Ellerth were decided reveals that, as a
practical matter, the employers won. The abstract review of standards of
liability in Part II might lead one to conclude that the Supreme Court
firmly embraced vicarious liability-liability that is unrelated to the em-
ployer's conduct-for hostile environment harassment created by supervi-
sors. But most abstractions lose their purity and attractiveness when they
if not all harassment suits."); David Rubenstein, Harassment Prevention is Now a Must for U.S.
Companies, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 1999, at 31 (citing employment law expert's view that
Faragher and Ellerth "provided a blueprint for avoiding those avenues [of liability]"); Jerome R.
Stockfisch, Court Forcing Firms to Halt Harassment, TAMPA TRIB., Jan. 1, 1999, Bus. & Fin., at I
(indicating that although the court action admittedly "puts a much stronger burden on companies to
ensure their workplace is free of harassment," lawyers in the defense bar are not "complaining too
loudly" as the court provided some "good guidance on exactly what employers must do").
156. See Canoni, supra note 53 (reporting that under the new scheme, "(e]mployers who have
an effective, well-publicized sexual harassment complaint procedure in place and properly imple-
mented have a good chance of escaping liability and damages.").
157. See, e.g., Barrier, supra note 155, at 15 (describing the adoption of a rule of virtually au-
tomatic liability as the "downside" for employers of Faragher and Ellerth); Canoni, supra note 53
(noting that "[e]mployer groups urged the Court to adopt a negligence standard); see also Brief
Amicus Curiae for Respondent the City of Boca Raton at 15-17, Faragher (No. 97-282); Brief
Amici Curiae of the Equal Employment Advisory Council at 18-19, Faragher (No. 97-282); Brief
Amicus Curiae of the National Association of Manufacturers and Manufacturers Alliance for Produc-
tivity and Innovation in Support of Respondent at 15-30, Faragher (No. 97-282); Brief Amicus Cu-
riae of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America in Support of Respondent at 3-4,
16-21, Faragher (No. 97-282); Brief for Petitioner Burlington Industries, Inc. at 10-15, 24-26, El-
lerth (1998) (No. 97-569); Reply Brief for Petitioner Burlington Industries, Inc. at 4-11, 19-20, El-
lerth (No. 97-569); Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America in Support of Petitioner at 14-20, Ellerth (No. 97-569).
158. Lynna Goch, 1998: The Year in Review, BEST'S REV.-PROP. & CASUALTY INS. EDmON,
Jan. 1, 1999, 99 BREVPC (available in WL 10020425) ("A pair of Supreme Court rulings handed
down in June exposed employers to more sexual harassment lawsuits than ever before and took
away a potential defense. . . .); see also Kruse, supra note 23, at 456-63 (arguing that the new
framework unfairly penalizes employers for harassment they had no ability to control); Joyelle K.
Werner, Note, Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth: An Affirmative Defense Against Employer Liabil-
ity for Supervisory Harassment, 50 MERCER L. REV. 1121, 1131 (1999) (criticizing standard because
it does not allow employer to escape liability by claiming it had no actual or constructive notice of
harassment).
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confront reality, and this case is no different. To be sure, the principle
that employers can be held vicariously liable for harassment committed
by their supervisors--even if they themselves did nothing wrong-was
theoretically embraced by the Supreme Court. 59 Yet the affirmative de-
fense, particularly as interpreted by many trial and appellate courts has
effectively eliminated any vicarious liability for employers, making them
liable, instead, only when their own conduct is found wanting. 6°
A. The Supreme Court and the Affirmative Defense
Understanding the effect of the affirmative defense is a necessary
first step in analyzing the true standard of liability imposed by Faragher
and Ellerth. To prevail on the affirmative defense, the employer has the
burden of proving that it took all reasonable measures to prevent and
correct any harassment and that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to com-
plain or otherwise avoid harm.'61 In most cases of supervisor harassment,
liability will turn on whether the employer can successfully prove the af-
firmative defense. What happens when an employer is able to prove both
prongs of the affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence?
The crucial question is whether the employer will be excused from liabil-
ity entirely or only from any damages that could have been prevented
had the plaintiff promptly complained.
Neither Faragher nor Ellerth provides a definitive answer to that
question. In Faragher, the Court held that the employer could not prevail
on the affirmative defense given its failure to take reasonable preventive
measures and thus concluded that the employer was automatically liable
for the sexually hostile environment. 62 In Ellerth, the Court remanded
159. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
160. See, e.g., Watkins v. Professional Sec. Bureau, Ltd., No. 98-2555, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS
29841 (4th Cir. Nov. 15, 1999); Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258 (5th Cir. 1999);
Scrivener v. Socorro Independent Sch. Dist., 169 F.3d 969 (5th Cir. 1999); Shaw v. Autozone, Inc.,
180 F.3d 806 (7th Cir. 1999); Todd v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 175 F.3d 595 (8th Cir. 1999); Wright v.
Anixter, Inc., No. 98-17164, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 19962 (9th Cir. Aug. 18, 1999); Coates v. Sun-
dor Brands, Inc., 164 F.3d 1361 (1 1th Cir. 1999); Gunnell v. Utah Valley State College, 152 F.3d
1253 (10th Cir. 1998); Guerra v. Editorial Televisa-USA, Inc., No. 97-3670, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10082 (S.D. Fla. June 4, 1999); EEOC v. Barton Protective Svcs., 47 R Supp. 2d 57 (D.D.C. 1999);
Hetreed v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 96-C2021, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7219 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 1999);
Neal v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., No. 5:98-CV-521-B4(2), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9732 (E.D.N.C.
1999); Russell v. American Eagle Airlines, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 1330 (S.D. Fla. 1999); Fierro v. Saks
Fifth Avenue, 13 F. Supp. 2d 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Sconce v. Tandy Corp., 9 F. Supp. 2d 773 (W.D.
Ky. 1998); Montero v. AGCO Corp., 19 F. Supp. 2d 1143 (E.D. Cal. 1998); Jones v. USA Petroleum
Corp., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1379 (S.D. Ga. 1998).
161. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807, Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
162. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808 ("we hold as a matter of law that the City could not be
[Vol. 61:671
EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR SEXUAL HARRASSMENT
the case for consideration of whether the employer would be able to
mount an affirmative defense, without giving any guidance as to its
likely success. 63
Both Faragher and Ellerth are ambiguous about the effect of the af-
firmative defense they establish. There is some language in both opinions
to suggest that an employer who proves the defense benefits in terms of
the remedy to which the plaintiff is entitled, but remains liable for any
harm until the time at which a reasonable plaintiff would have resorted
to the employer's internal grievance process. For example, in the unified
holding, the Court states that "a defending employer may raise an af-
firmative defense to liability or damages. ' 164
But other clues suggest that the affirmative defense insulates the em-
ployer from liability altogether. The Court, remember, was not working
from a blank slate-it had provided some preliminary guidance about
employer liability for hostile environment harassment twelve years earlier
in Meritor. Meritor issued somewhat inconsistent proclamations, as it at
once endorsed the use of agency principles to hold employers vicariously
liable for harassment, but rejected strict liability for employers.' 65 These
two mandates proved difficult for litigants and courts to reconcile, as a
pure application of agency principles dictates a rule of strict liability for
supervisor harassment. But the Court in Faragher and Ellerth read Mer-
itor as an undeniable rejection of strict liability. I6 And the effect of con-
struing the affirmative defense to affect only damages, not liability,
would be to impose a rule of automatic liability for all forms of supervi-
sor harassment-both quid pro quo, as reformulated, and hostile environ-
ment. This result would be flatly inconsistent with the spectrum of em-
found to have exercised reasonable care to prevent the supervisors' harassing conduct").
163. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. Although Ellerth has not yet been resolved on remand, the
plaintiff is unlikely to prevail because, in spite of the fact that the employer had a policy against
sexual harassment that had been distributed to all employees, the plaintiff made no attempt to com-
plain or otherwise make use of the company's internal grievance procedures. See id. Only after quit-
ting the company did Ellerth write a letter to the management explaining that her departure resulted
from her supervisor's harassing conduct. See id. Thus, unless the plaintiff can prove it was reasona-
ble to forego such avenues of relief, the employer is likely to prevail on the affirmative defense. See,
e.g., EEOC to Issue New Sexual Harassment Policy, Federal EEO Advisor (Jan. 1999) (describing
Ellerth as a "difficult sexual harassment case" for the plaintiff because of the lack of notice to the
employer and her failure to complain).
164. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
165. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72 (Title VII does not make employers "always automatically liable
for sexual harassment by their supervisors").
166. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 804; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 763.
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ployer liability delineated in Meritor, under the Court's interpretation of
that case.
In fact, the Court in Faragher and Ellerth not only acknowledged
Meritor's rejection of strict liability, 67 but solidified it by applying en-
hanced stare decisis to the holding. 6 Important to the Court's analysis
was the fact that Congress amended Title VII in 1991, leaving Meritor
intact. A Supreme Court holding combined with the tacit approval of
Congress justified, in the Court's eyes, invoking "enhanced stare decisis"
and strictly adhering to Meritor's purported limitations on liability.
To adhere to the holding in Meritor, the Court explained, it would
have to graft some limitation onto the general rule of automatic liability
for hostile environment harassment. 69 The Court considered two alterna-
tives to accomplish that result: (1) requiring "proof of some affirmative
invocation of that authority by the harassing supervisor," or (2) recogniz-
ing "an affirmative defense to liability in some circumstances, even when
a supervisor has created the actionable environment."'' 70 Both alterna-
tives, the Court reasoned, would safely guard Meritor's rejection of auto-
matic liability by carving out certain situations where an employer will
avoid liability even where its supervisor actionably harassed a
subordinate employee.' Adopting the latter approach, the Court again
referred to the limitation on liability:
The other basic alternative to automatic liability would avoid this particular tempta-
tion to litigate [about the actual invocation of supervisory authority], but allow an
167. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 763 ("Meritor's statement of the law is the foundation on which
we build today. Neither party before us has urged us to depart from our customary adherence to stare
decisis in statutory interpretation."); Faragher, 524 U.S. at 792 ("We are not entitled to recognize
this theory under Title VII unless we can square it with Meritor's holding that an employer is not
'automatically' liable for harassment by a supervisor who creates the requisite degree of discrimina-
tion."); id. at 804 (the Court is "bound by [its] holding in Meritor that agency principles constrain
the imposition of vicarious liability in cases of supervisory harassment.").
168. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 792 ("[T]he force of precedent here is enhanced by Con-
gress's (1991] amendment to the liability provisions of Title VII since the Meritor decision, without
any modification of the our holding."); id. at 804 n.4 (The Court is "bound to honor" Meritor be-
cause Congress amended Title VII without disturbing the holding, thus implicitly adopting the stan-
dard set therein.); Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 763-64 (noting Congressional silence in analysis of stare deci-
sis). For a compelling argument that enhanced stare decisis was not justified in this case given the
lack of a clear signal to Congress that a particular rule of liability had been established, see The Su-
preme Court 1997 Term, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1, 313-326 (1998) (criticizing the Faragher and Ellerth
decisions for invoking enhanced stare decisis to adopt an ill-advised, weak rule of employer
liability).
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employer to show as an affirmative defense to liability that the employer had exer-
cised reasonable care to avoid harassment and to eliminate it when it might occur,
and that the complaining employee had failed to act with the like reasonable care
to take advantage of the employer's safeguards and otherwise prevent harm that
could have been avoided. This composite defense would, we think, implement the
statute sensibly, for reasons that are not hard to fathom." 2
But after adopting this "affirmative defense to liability," the Court re-
treated to language about mitigating harm and avoiding unnecessary dam-
ages, again suggesting that the defense it crafted might spare the em-
ployer only in terms of remedy rather than liability.'73
In the end, the best reading of these opinions with respect to the af-
firmative defense is that in some cases the defense should avoid liability
and in some it should reduce damages. The Court in Faragher ultimately
described the rule's application as follows:
If the plaintiff unreasonably failed to avail herself of the employer's preventive or
remedial apparatus, she should not recover damages that could have been avoided
if she had done so. If the victim could have avoided harm, no liability should be
found against the employer who had taken reasonable care, and if damages could
reasonably have been mitigated no award against a liable employer should reward
a plaintiff for what her own efforts could have avoided. 74
Drawing a distinction between the former situation the Court de-
scribes (where the plaintiff could have avoided some but not all of the
harm) and the latter (where the plaintiff could have avoided harm alto-
gether) is no easy task. The circumstances under which a victim could
have completely "avoided harm" turn, of course, on the definition of
harm. If "harm" is inflicted on the recipient of any unwanted sexual ad-
vance, comment, or gesture, regardless of the severity or pervasiveness,
there is no situation where a victim employee could avoid all harm; for
there is nothing to complain about until the harm occurs and no way, in
a typical case, to anticipate its infliction. This notion of harm would
render the Court's distinction between a defense to liability and damages
meaningless, for in every case it would affect only the latter. Harm, then,
must refer in this context to something that can be avoided.
172. Id. at 805 (emphasis added).
173. Id. at 806 ("The requirement to show that the employee has failed in a coordinate duty
to avoid or mitigate harm reflects an equally obvious policy imported from the general theory of
damages, that a victim has a duty 'to use such means as are reasonable under the circumstances to
avoid or minimize the damages' that result from violations of the statute." (quoting Ford Motor Co.
v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 231 n.15 (1982)).
174. Id. at 806-07.
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Alternatively, and perhaps more true to the Supreme Court's intent,
harm could be construed in legal terms; that is, the "harm" attaches
when an actionable hostile environment matures, regardless of the subjec-
tive experience of harm preceding that point. If harm is inflicted only
when an environment becomes actionable, there are situations where a
plaintiff could avoid "harm" entirely. The opportunity to avoid harm
would arise only where the hostile environment develops gradually. In
that situation, the plaintiff might have the opportunity to complain before
any legally recognizable harm is done. The plaintiff who fails to do so
would have no cause of action against the employer for any harm that
subsequently ensued. However, where the hostile environment develops
quickly-if not instantaneously-the plaintiff would not have such an op-
portunity. In theory, that plaintiff would be able to hold the employer lia-
ble for the initial act of harassment, which even a timely complaint could
not have forestalled, though not for any subsequent harassment that could
have been prevented. It is this interpretation that the EEOC seems to
adopt in its revised guidelines, suggesting in one example that the affirm-
ative defense would affect damages but not liability where a plaintiff
failed to complain about a supervisor's use of frequent, egregious racial
epithets "that caused emotional harm virtually from the outset . .. 175
A prompt complaint by such an employee would, according to the
EEOC, have "reduced, but not eliminated, the actionable harm."' 176
B. Lower Courts and the Affirmative Defense
Applied correctly, the Faragher and Ellerth rule should result in vi-
carious liability for the employer under some circumstances (a single, se-
vere act of harassment) regardless of the fact that the employer may have
responded adequately to stop the harassment and prevent further occur-
rences. Many lower courts have, however, significantly curtailed the
scope of Faragher and Ellerth using two techniques: (1) by construing
the affirmative defense to completely absolve the employer of liability re-
gardless of the type of harassment; or (2) by refusing to apply a rule of
vicarious liability where the employer responds appropriately to the
plaintiff's complaint.
175. EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 71, at E-27.
176. Id.
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1. An Affirmative Defense to Liability
The first technique for providing employers with a negligence-based
safe harbor is to treat the affirmative defense as a defense to liability, re-
gardless of whether the hostile environment matures before the plaintiff
has an opportunity to complain. The effect of this approach is to give the
employer one free bite, as an adequate response to known harassment
will absolve the employer of liability for the harassment from its outset.
The Fifth Circuit endorsed this approach in Scrivener v. Socorro In-
dependent School District.'77 In that case, the court affirmed a grant of
summary judgment to the employer based on the affirmative defense, re-
jecting the plaintiff's argument that her failure to complain should reduce
her damages but not insulate the employer from liability.'78 The court ex-
plained: "[a]lthough Scrivener argues that the EllerthiFaragher affirma-
tive defense goes to damages, the Supreme Court itself characterized the
defense as a limit to liability."17 9 Thus, under Scrivener, an employer can
cure the problem-from a liability standpoint-simply by making sure it
does not happen again.
Trial courts have effectively reached the same result as the Fifth
Circuit in Scrivener. Although there are no published trial court opinions
that specifically address the proper construction of the affirmative de-
fense, the issue is foreclosed by the analytic approach taken by most
courts. The distinction between liability and damages can be drawn, if at
all, only by understanding the nature of the harassment at issue and the
177. 169 F.3d 969 (5th Cir. 1999). Two other circuits have briefly considered this issue and
avoided Scrivener's mistake by recognizing that the affirmative defense may affect liability or dam-
ages depending on the circumstances. In Greene v. Dalton, the D.C. Circuit reversed the district
court's grant of summary judgment based on its failure to consider whether the affirmative defense
was a defense to liability or damages under the circumstances. 164 F.3d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Plain-
tiff Luria Greene averred that her supervisor engaged in a pattern of unwelcome sexual discussions
and amorous advances that culminated in rape ten days after she began work. See id. at 673. Greene
did not file a complaint or report the harassment until more than a month after the rape, when her
supervisor again propositioned her. See id. Whether the employer could avoid all liability, the court
held, would turn on whether "a reasonable person in Greene's place would have come forward early
enough to prevent Clause's harassment from becoming 'severe or pervasive."' Id. at 675. That is,
would a reasonable person have complained within the first ten days and thus prevented the rape,
which rendered the environment hostile as a matter of law. The court of appeals remanded the case
because "too little is known about Clause's behavior in the first ten days of Greene's employment."
Id. The Seventh Circuit in Savino v. C.P Hall Co. rejected the plaintiff's suggestion that the affirma-
tive defense could affect only damages, not liability. 199 F.3d 925 (7th Cir. 1999). The Court con-
cluded that, in the context of sexual harassment, "unreasonable foot-dragging will result in at least a
partial reduction of damages, and may completely foreclose liability." Id. at 935.
178. See Scrivener, 169 F.3d at 970-73.
179. Id. at 972 (citing Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 767 (1998)).
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timing of any complaint. Specifically, to honor the Supreme Court's in-
tent, courts must distinguish between harassment that could have been
halted had the plaintiff complained before it became actionable and har-
assment that could have been stopped only after becoming actionable.
Rather than permitting the factual development necessary to make
that distinction, however, many trial courts simply assume that an action-
able hostile environment exists for the sake of argument and ask whether
the employer has offered sufficient evidence to succeed on the affirma-
tive defense. A finding that the affirmative defense is viable is followed,
without further analysis, by a grant of summary judgment to the em-
ployer.80 In Fierro v. Saks Fifth Avenue,' 8' for example, the district court
entered summary judgment for the employer based solely on proof of the
affirmative defense. 82 Likewise, the district court in Sconce v. Tandy
Corp."3 dismissed the plaintiff's complaint with prejudice after the em-
ployer satisfied its burden of proof on the affirmative defense. 8 4 Other
cases have entered similar dispositions."5 This practice gives the court no
180. There is an emerging literature questioning the appropriateness of summary judgment in
this context for a host of reasons apart from any misapplication of the affirmative defense. See gen-
erally Beiner, supra note 22, at 71 (criticizing lower courts for overuse of summary judgment based
on "severe and pervasive" element of hostile environment claims and attributing overuse in part to
lack of diversity on the federal bench, misunderstanding of the nature of sexual harassment claims,
and pressure to clear dockets); Medina, supra note 22, at 311 (criticizing an apparent trend toward
increased use of summary judgment in sexual harassment cases based on idea that jury should decide
fact-intensive questions such as those involved in hostile environment harassment); Note, Notice in
Hostile Environment Discrimination Law, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1977, 1994 (1999) (suggesting that
judgments about reasonableness embodied in the affirmative defense "are better suited to jury deter-
mination than to summary judgment"). But see Buchanan & Wiswall, supra note 22 (predicting that
affirmative defense may decrease availability of summary judgment to employers); Jonathan W.
Dion, Note, Putting Employers on the Defense: The Supreme Court Develops a Consistent Standard
Regarding an Employer's Liability for a Supervisor's Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment,
34 WAKE FoREsT L. REV. 199 (1999) (positing that the affirmative defense places a new burden on
employers that will "severely hamper" their ability to obtain grants of summary judgment).
181. 13 F. Supp.2d 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
182. See id. at 487-95.
183. 9 F. Supp.2d 773 (W.D. Ky. 1998).
184. See id. at 775-78.
185. See, e.g., Shaw v. Autozone, Inc., 180 F3d 806 (7th Cir. 1999) (affirming summary judg-
ment for employer on affirmative defense without consideration of whether actionable hostile envi-
ronment existed); Coates v. Sundor Brands, Inc., 164 F.3d 1361 (1 1th Cir. 1999) (granting employer
summary judgment on affirmative defense despite concession that actionable hostile environment ex-
isted); Wright v. Anixter, Inc., No. 98-17164, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 19962 (9th Cir. Aug. 18, 1999)
(affirming summary judgment based on affirmative defense without inquiring into threshold claim of
harassment); Gunnell v. Utah Valley State College, 152 F3d 1253 (10th Cir. 1998); Montero v.
AGCO Corp., 19 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1146 (E.D. Cal. 1998) (granting summary judgment to the em-
ployer upon proof of the affirmative defense); Guerra v. Editorial Televisa-USA, Inc., No. 97-3670,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10082 (S.D. Fla. June 4, 1999) (same); EEOC v. Barton Protective Svcs., 47
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opportunity to consider whether a prompt complaint would have pre-
vented only some or all of the harm suffered by the plaintiff. The result
is to deprive the plaintiff of her cause of action based solely on the af-
firmative defense, regardless of the type of harassment or timing of any
complaint. The shortcut taken by these courts is tantamount to adopting
the view that the affirmative defense completely immunizes an employer
from liability.
Thus, whether directly, as in Scrivener, or indirectly, as in Fierro,
many courts have embraced the principle that an employer who has taken
reasonable preventative and corrective measures should be completely ab-
solved of liability, even if a legally hostile environment existed before
any action was taken.
2. The Refusal to Apply Faragher and Ellerth
Three federal courts of appeals have given credence to the "first
bite" principle with even more flagrant disregard for the Supreme
Court's mandate. In Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc.,86 the Fifth Cir-
cuit crafted an entirely new basis for relieving the employer of liability
for harassment that gives the employer a means to escape liability en-
tirely and effectively eliminates the second prong of the affirmative de-
fense. In that case, plaintiff Constance Indest, an exhibit representative,
sued Freeman Decorating based on a series of unwelcome sexual ad-
vances, comments, and gestures committed by her supervisor, Larry
Amaudet, during an out-of-town trade show.'87 Upon return to her home
office, Indest reported all of the incidents to the branch manager. 88 By
any standard, the employer took sufficient corrective measures, including
conducting a thorough investigation, issuing a written reprimand to the
supervisor, suspending the supervisor upon learning of possible plans to
retaliate, and guaranteeing Indest that she would never again have to
F. Supp. 2d 57 (D.D.C. 1999) (assuming existence of hostile environment and granting summary
judgment to the employer based on affirmative defense); Hetreed v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 96-C2021,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7219 (N.D. Ill. May I1, 1999) (granting summary judgment for employer
based on affirmative defense); Neal v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., No. 5:98-CV-521-B4(2), 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9732 (E.D.N.C.) (same); Russell v. American Eagle Airlines, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d
1330 (S.D. Fla.) (granting summary judgment based on affirmative defense despite proof of
"deplorable harassment"); Jones v. USA Petroleum Corp., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1379 (S.D. Ga. 1998)
(granting summary judgment based on affirmative defense based on proof of well-enforced anti-
harassment policy).
186. 164 F.3d 258 (5th Cir. 1999).
187. See id. at 260.
188. See id.
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work with the supervisor.'8 9 Those corrective measures proved successful
as, according to Indest, the harassment ceased.' 90 The district court, rul-
ing without the benefit of Faragher and Ellerth, granted summary judg-
ment to the employer, concluding that "Freeman's actions were suffi-
ciently swift and effective to preclude corporate vicarious liability for
Arnaudet's conduct."' 19 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit considered the pro-
priety of that ruling in light of Faragher and Ellerth.
While the court of appeals questioned whether Arnaudet's conduct
was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an actionable hostile envi-
ronment, it declined to rule on that threshold issue, resolving the case in-
stead on the basis of employer liability. 92 The court of appeals began by
correctly acknowledging that the employer could not utilize the affirma-
tive defense because the plaintiff promptly complained and thus did not
unreasonably fail to take advantage of opportunities to avoid or mitigate
harm. 193 Thus, a straightforward application of Faragher and Ellerth
would clearly dictate automatic liability for the employer provided the
plaintiff could prove she had suffered an actionable hostile environment
before she had the opportunity to complain. 94
Rejecting the straightforward approach out of hand, the court instead
held that the company was completely absolved of liability, regardless of
whether the conduct prior to Indest's complaint qualified as an actionable
hostile environment. 95 To reach this conclusion, the court tossed the en-
tire Faragher/Ellerth framework aside, holding that where an employer
responds quickly and appropriately to a victim's complaint of sexual har-
assment, the new standards prescribed by the Supreme Court do not ap-
ply. 96 As a practical matter, the Indest court eliminated the second prong
of the affirmative defense by granting the employer a complete defense
to liability when it responds appropriately to a plaintiff's complaint of
sexual harassment. Thus, in the Fifth Circuit, such an employer cannot be
189. See id. at 260-61.
190. See id. at 261.
191. Id. at 263.
192. See id. at 264 ("Whether Indest was subjected to a sexually hostile working environment
might be a close question on this summary judgment record, but it is a question that we do not need
to address, because there is another basis on which Indest's claim falls short. Indest cannot establish
a basis for Freeman's liability as her employer.").
193. See id. at 265.
194. See id.
195. See id. at 267.
196. See id. at 265.
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held liable, regardless of whether the plaintiff fulfilled her duty to
complain.
Judge Wiener concurred in the court's judgment based on his con-
clusion that the plaintiff had not proven that the harassment had risen to
the level of an actionable hostile environment, but strongly disputed the
majority's refusal to apply the rule of automatic liability. 197 A fair inter-
pretation of Faragher and Ellerth does not permit the panel's exemption
for cases where the employer takes prompt action. In most cases, Judge
Wiener correctly observed, the employer will not face liability where it
responded promptly and effectively because its actions will stymie the
maturation of the hostile environment. It is, of course, theoretically possi-
ble, Judge Wiener reasoned,
for a supervisor to engage in sufficiently severe conduct (e.g., raping, 'flashing,' or
forcibly groping or disrobing the subordinate employee) in such a short period of
time that, even though (1) the employee reports the conduct immediately, (2) the
employer takes swift and decisive remedial action, and (3) no tangible employment
action ensues, the employer could still be held liable under the Ellerth/Faragher
"severe or pervasive" test. 98
But like the courts that treat the affirmative defense as a complete de-
fense to liability, the Indest majority deprives plaintiffs of a claim based
on a negligence principle-the adequacy of the employer's response to
known harassment.
The Eighth Circuit in Todd v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 9' like the Fifth
Circuit in indest, discarded the rule of Faragher and Ellerth and created
an exception to liability for employers who respond adequately to the
harassment, but nonetheless cannot prevail on the affirmative defense be-
cause the plaintiff reports the harassment. Plaintiff Lori Todd, a sales rep-
resentative for a biotechnology company, was sexually assaulted at a na-
tional sales meeting by an employee with supervisory authority. 200
Although a jury found the employer liable under Title VII, the court of
appeals vacated the judgment of the court of appeals and ordered recon-
sideration in light of Faragher/Ellerth.2°0
Deferring to the district court to apply Faragher and Ellerth in the
first instance, the court of appeals remanded the case with only some
197. See Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 168 F.2d 795, 796-97 (5th Cir. 1999) (Wiener, J.,
concurring).
198. Id. at 804 n.52.
199. 175 F.3d 595 (8th Cir. 1999).
200. See id. at 597.
201. See id. at 597-99.
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vague dicta for guidance. The majority correctly recognized that the em-
ployer would be subject to automatic liability for the assault because the
plaintiff's prompt complaint would deprive it of the affirmative defense.
The court worried, however, that such an outcome would needlessly con-
tort the Supreme Court's holding in Faragher and Ellerth which, in its
view, "was adopted to avoid 'automatic' employer liability and to give
credit to employers who make reasonable efforts to prevent and remedy
sexual harassment.1' 202 The affirmative defense, the court of appeals cau-
tioned, was
adopted in cases that involved ongoing sexual harassment in a workplace, and may
not protect an employer from automatic liability in cases of single, severe, unan-
ticipatable sexual harassment unless, for example, the harassment does not ripen
into an actionable hostile work environment claim until the employer learns that
the harassment has occurred and fails to take proper remedial action. 203
To protect the employer from liability for harassment that matured before
the employer had the opportunity to respond, the Todd majority suggested
that a single, severe act of harassment could never constitute an actiona-
ble hostile environment. 2°4 Such an approach prevents a plaintiff from re-
covering for any initial act of harassment as long as the employer subse-
quently responds. Thus, as with the approach taken under Indest, Todd
interprets Faragher and Ellerth to hold employers liable only based on
their own misconduct or inaction, absolving them of liability for the first
bite.
Finally, the Fourth Circuit in Watkins v. Professional Security Bu-
reau, Ltd.,205 followed suit in dicta. In Watkins, the court granted judg-
ment as a matter of law to the employer based on the affirmative de-
fense. 2°6 The employer had a policy against harassment and the victim
had not complained to the employer, thus enabling the employer to pre-
vail on the both prongs of the defense.207 However, the court made clear
that the plaintiff's failure to complain was essentially irrelevant under its
interpretation of Faragher and Ellerth.
202. Id. at 598 (emphasis added).
203. Id.
204. See id. Although he concurred in the result, Judge Arnold took issue with the majority's
view, expressing "no doubt that a single severe act of sexual harassment can amount to a hostile
work environment actionable under Title VII." Id. at 599. Judge Arnold, though not joining issue
with the majority, drew a distinction between cases in which the affirmative defense eliminates lia-
bility and those in which it reduces damages. See id. at 599-600.
205. No. 98-2555, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 29841 (4th Cir. Nov. 15, 1999).
206. See id. at *23.
207. See id. at *34.
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Even if [the plaintiff's] disclosure of the harassment to [a low-level supervisor]
were adequate to establish that she took advantage of available preventive or cor-
rective opportunities, our result would be the same. Although the Supreme Court
did not speak to this issue in Burlington Industries, we cannot conceive that an em-
ployer that satisfies the first element of the affirmative defense and that promptly
and adequately responds to a reported incident of sexual harassment ... would be
held liable for the harassment on the basis of an inability to satisfy the literal terms
of the second element of the affirmative defense. . . . Such a result would be
wholly contrary to a laudable purpose behind limitations on employer liability
identified by the Supreme Court in Burlington Industries: to promote
conciliation.208
Thus, the Fourth Circuit too, has rejected the plain meaning of
Faragher and Ellerth in favor of its own, narrower view of when em-
ployers should be held liable for supervisor harassment.
C. The Impact of the Affirmative Defense
With these rules in mind, the best way to understand Faragher and
Ellerth is to examine different scenarios involving hostile work environ-
ment harassment and their projected outcomes compared to the outcomes
dictated by a negligence rule of liability.
1. Employer Takes Inadequate Preventative Measures
Under Faragher and Ellerth, an employer who fails to take adequate
measures to prevent harassment in the first instance will not be able to
prove the first prong of the affirmative defense and thus will be held lia-
ble for all subsequent harassment. For example, an employer who does
not maintain a formal anti-harassment policy or otherwise warn employ-
ees that harassment is prohibited209 can fairly be held liable for all har-
assment under the new scheme, regardless of how it responds to com-
plaints of harassment. The employer in this situation is punished, in
208. Id. at *21 n.16 (citations omitted).
209. In most cases, the harassment policy must be a written, formal policy. See Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) (noting that "proof that an employer had promulgated
an anti harassment policy" will usually be necessary). But smaller employers may be able to get by
with an informal policy, as long as the idea that harassment will not be tolerated is adequately com-
municated to employees. See id. (a small workforce "might expect that sufficient care to prevent tor-
tuous behavior could be exercised informally"); EEOC, Questions & Answers for Small Employers
on Employer Liability for Harassment by Supervisors (visited May 2, 2000), <http://www.eeoc.gov/
docs/harassment-facts.html> at 2 ("Small businesses may be able to discharge their ability to prevent
and correct harassment through less formal means."); cf. Pacheco v. New Life Bakery, Inc., 187 F2d
1055 (9th Cir. 1999), withdrawn, 187 F3d 1063 (9th Cir. 1999) (even if employer qualified as small
workforce, preventative measures insufficient where it had "no sexual harassment policy nor com-
plaint procedure in place, either formal or informal").
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essence, for his own negligence in failing to take measures to prevent
harassment.
Under a rule of simple negligence, an employer who does not act to
prevent harassment may also be found liable, but only if it also fails to
correct the harassment. An employer is negligent where it has actual or
constructive notice of a hostile environment and fails to respond. An em-
ployer that fails to maintain an effective policy may be charged with con-
structive notice of all harassment.210 Thus the difference between
Faragher and Ellerth and a negligence rule comes when an employer
fails to take steps to prevent harassment but subsequently corrects the
problem. In that situation, Faragher and Ellerth dictate automatic liability
whereas a negligence framework finds none. Thus, the penalty for failing
to enact and maintain an effective harassment policy is more severe
under Faragher and Ellerth than under a rule of simple negligence in
that it dictates liability for the employer regardless of how it responds af-
ter the fact.2 '
2. Employer Takes Adequate Preventative Measures
When an employer takes adequate measures to prevent harassment,
its liability turns on three additional variables: (1) the victim's response,
(2) the employer's response, and (3) the type of harassment. First, the
victim may either complain or fail to complain. Second, the employer
may take or fail to take adequate corrective measures. Third, these varied
employer and victim responses may be taken in response to two types of
hostile work environment harassment. The first, which I will term perva-
sive, non-severe harassment ("Type A"), occurs when a supervisor sub-
jects a subordinate employee to periodic unwelcome sexual advances,
comments, and gestures. The second, which I will term severe, non-
pervasive harassment ("Type B"), occurs when a supervisor subjects a
subordinate employee to a single act, such as sexual assault, sufficiently
severe to create an actionable hostile environment. The interplay of these
three elements-victim response, employer response, and type of harass-
ment-controls employer liability in cases where the employer takes ade-
quate preventative measures.
210. See EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 71, at 6697 (the EEOC will generally "find an
employer liable . . . when the employer failed to establish an explicit policy against sexual harass-
ment and did not have a reasonably available avenue by which victims of sexual harassment could
complain to someone with authority to investigate and remedy the problem").
211. Even the cases softening the impact of Faragher and Ellerth would impose liability in
this scenario.
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a. Employer Takes Inadequate Corrective Measures
Where the employer fails to take adequate measures to remedy a
known hostile environment, it is always liable, regardless of the type of
harassment. Under a negligence theory, it is directly liable for breaching
its affirmative duty to correct a known hostile environment; under
Faragher and Ellerth, it is vicariously liable because it is not able to sat-
isfy the first prong of the affirmative defense.212 Although the theory is
different, the liability in both cases is premised on the employer's own
conduct-in this case its inaction in the face of a known hostile
environment.
b. Employer Takes Adequate Corrective Measures
(1) Type A Harassment: Plaintiff Complains
Under a negligence theory, the employer would avoid liability for
non-severe harassment based on its adequate response. Under Faragher
and Ellerth, if the plaintiff takes advantage of the employer's complaint
mechanism within a reasonable period of time, the employer will not be
able to prevail on the second prong of the affirmative defense. Without
the benefit of the affirmative defense, the employer is strictly liable for
any actionable sexual harassment. 213 The key word here, though, is "ac-
tionable." Under existing case law, the employer will rarely face liability
with this type of harassment when the employer corrects or stops the
conduct in a timely manner because the reasonable period of time within
which the plaintiff must complain will lapse long before the hostile envi-
ronment matures.214 The employer, in other words, usually has a chance
to nip the harassment in the bud before it blossoms into pervasive, and
hence actionable, harassment. Thus, although the plaintiff promptly re-
ports the supervisor, she will likely not have a viable claim unless the
employer responds inappropriately or with inaction. However, if the hos-
212. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
213. See id.
214. See, e.g., Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 265 (5th Cir. 1999) ("When
a plaintiff promptly complains about a supervisor's inappropriate sexual actions, she can thwart the
creation of a hostile work environment. To the extent redress is sought, is justified, and is adequately
provided by the company, the complained-of incidents will not likely have become severe or perva-
sive enough to create an actionable Title VII claim."); Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 168 F.3d
795, 803 (5th Cir. 1999) (wiener, J., concurring) ("[A]s a practical matter, inappropriate sexual con-
duct will virtually never rise to the level of actionability when an employer takes the kind of prompt
remedial action that (was taken in this case].").
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tile environment accrues before the plaintiff has an opportunity to com-
plain, the employer would be liable. The construction of the affirmative
defense in Todd, Indest, and Watkins, however, would change this result
and mimic a negligence rule. In those circuits, even if the hostile envi-
ronment matures before the plaintiff has an opportunity to complain, an
employer who responds promptly and appropriately can never be held li-
able for the harassment. 215
(2) Type B Harassment: Plaintiff Complains
If the plaintiff reports severe, non-pervasive harassment, the em-
ployer will not be able to succeed on the second prong of the affirmative
defense. The employer would then be subject to strict liability for any
harm caused by the initial assault under Faragher and Ellerth. This result
differs from that under a negligence rule, which would not hold an em-
ployer liable because it did not (indeed-could not) know of the harass-
ment in time to stop it. For this reason, of course, employers held only to
a negligence standard would never be held liable for the single, severe
acts of their supervisors. Todd, Indest, and Watkins effectuate the same
result, an employer to escape liability for a sexual assault as long as it
responds promptly and effectively to a plaintiff's complaint. 216
(3) Type A Harassment: Plaintiff Fails to Complain
Under Faragher and Ellerth, if the plaintiff does not complain about
non-severe harassment, the employer will be able to satisfy both prongs
of the affirmative defense.217 The employer will avoid liability entirely
regardless of whether the affirmative defense is construed as a limit on
liability or damages. Even if Faragher and Ellerth permit a court to re-
duce damages rather than liability where the plaintiff could have avoided
some but not all of the harm, these facts do not fall into that category.
Rather, the harm is the actionable hostile environment and, as above, a
reasonable person, as courts have construed that concept, would complain
about that harm long before the environment became actionable. 28 Con-
215. See, e.g., Indest, 164 F.3d at 265-66.
216. See id.
217. See Faragher, 524 U.S. 775.
218. See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Barton Protective Svcs., 47 F
Supp. 2d 57, 61 (D.D.C. 1999) (applying affirmative defense based on plaintiff's eleven-month delay
in complaining about daily harassment because "a reasonable person in [her] place would have come
forward early enough to prevent [her supervisor's] harassment from becoming 'severe or
pervasive').
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sequently, the employer is thus entitled to escape liability where a
prompt complaint would have prevented any legal harm. Negligence the-
ory produces the same result using a different analysis: the employer
would be excused from liability based on lack of notice due to the plain-
tiff's failure to complain of the harassment.
(4) Type B Harassment: Plaintiff Fails to Complain
If the plaintiff fails to complain about severe harassment, the em-
ployer can successfully prove the affirmative defense. Here, however, dif-
ferent constructions of the affirmative defense produce different results. If
the defense goes to liability, the plaintiff will be deprived of a cause of
action for the assault as well as any subsequent harassment. Negligence
theory would produce the same result, rejecting the employer's liability
based on lack of notice. If the defense merely goes to damages, however,
the plaintiff should be able to recover for the assault (which she could
not have prevented), but not for any harassment subsequent to the time at
which a reasonable person would have complained (which arguably she
could have prevented). 19 This approach, seemingly mandated by
Faragher and Ellerth but ignored by several circuits, would impose a
higher standard of liability than negligence by holding the employer lia-
ble despite its lack of notice.
As the above discussion illustrates, the differences in outcomes be-
tween direct and vicarious liability are limited even if the rules of
Faragher and Ellerth are correctly applied. Faragher and Ellerth impose
a greater penalty for the failure to maintain an anti-harassment policy and
impose liability for an initial severe act of harassment despite the plain-
tiff's subsequent failure to complain. In every other scenario, both a neg-
ligence theory and Faragher and Ellerth hold an employer liable only
where it fails to respond to known harassment. These differences are fur-
ther diluted by lower court interpretations of the rules of vicarious liabil-
ity, which refuse to find liability in the latter situation.
III. A CRITIQUE OF THE NEW STANDARDS: LEGAL, THEORETICAL, AND
PRACTICAL PROBLEMS
Despite being ostensibly premised on a theory of vicarious liability,
Faragher and Ellerth have given birth to a framework that hesitates to
219. This same reasoning would apply where the hostile environment is not the result of a sin-
gle, severe act, but develops at a rate or in a context in which a reasonable plaintiff would not have
complained until after the environment became actionable.
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impose liability against an employer where it was not at fault and had no
opportunity to prevent the harassment. These cases explicitly authorize
the absolution of liability where a plaintiff does not complain and a
prompt complaint might have given the employer the opportunity to pre-
vent an incipient hostile environment from becoming actionable.220 Lower
courts have given an even broader sweep to the "first bite" principle that
employers should be given notice and an opportunity to respond before
being held liable for supervisor harassment. Some courts have permitted
employers to avoid all liability-regardless of the type of harassment-
simply by reacting appropriately to complaints;22' other courts have used
a plaintiff's failure to complain promptly about severe harassment to rob
her not only of damages for subsequent harassment that could have been
prevented, but also of liability for the harassment that could not.122
While granting employers a safe harbor for harassment they had no
opportunity to prevent may have some intuitive appeal, such lenience
contorts relevant legal principles and undermines important policy goals.
This part of the article, therefore, critiques the affirmative defense-as
intended and as applied-on legal and policy grounds.
A. Undermining Twin Goals of Title VII
Before issuing its pronouncements in Faragher and Ellerth, the Su-
preme Court had repeatedly recognized that Title VII has two separate,
yet equally important goals: compensation 223 and deterrence. 224 In fact, a
220. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807 (explaining affirmative defense adopted in both cases).
221. See, e.g., Watkins v. Professional Security Bureau, Ltd., 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 29841
(4th Cir. 1999); Indest, 164 F3d at 258; Todd v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 175 F.3d 595 (8th Cir. 1999).
' 222. See, e.g., Scrivener v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 169 F.3d 969 (5th Cir. 1999) (affimiative
defense goes to liability not damages).
223. See, e.g., McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358 (1995)
("Compensation for injuries caused by the prohibited discrimination is [one goal of Title VII and the
ADEA]"); Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 282 (1994) (the Civil Rights Act of 1991
"reflects Congress' desire to afford victims of discrimination more complete redress for violations of
[Title VIII"); Irwin v. Department of Veteran Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 102 (1990) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (advocating for a particular rule because it is "consistent with our
previous admonitions that Title VII, a remedial statute, should be construed in favor of those whom
the legislation was designed to protect"); Nord v. United States Steel Corp., 758 F.2d 1462, 1472
(11 th Cir. 1985) (citing Title VII's "make whole" rationale); see also Kolstad v. American Dental
Ass'n, 119 S. Ct. 2118, 2129 (1999) (recognizing Title VIl's goal of remediation).
224. See, e.g., McKennon, 513 U.S. at 358 (fashioning rule to serve Title Vii's deterrent pur-
pose); Price-Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 276 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (urging
Court to apply particular rule to situations where "deterrent purpose of Title VII is most clearly im-
plicated"); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975) (describing Title Vll's primary
goal as "prophylactic").
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motivating force behind the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which amended
Title VII, was to make damages available to victims of employment dis-
crimination.225 But in Faragher and Ellerth, the Supreme Court elevated
deterrence to the "primary" goal and left compensation by the way-
side.226 The Court's reconstructionist history paved the way for a frame-
work designed primarily to prevent harassment from occurring, at the
cost of undercompensating victims when prevention fails.
The goal of compensation is clearly undermined by the affirmative
defense. As explained above, the affirmative defense operates to ensure
that some harms of sexual harassment are not compensable. By limiting
an employer's liability based on the victim's failure to complain, as many
courts do, the rule deprives the victim not only of damages for any harm
that could have been prevented, but also of any damages resulting from
the first, unpreventable incident and of any declaratory or injunctive re-
lief. There is every reason to compensate the victim for whatever harm
flows from the initial act of harassment. The Supreme Court has specifi-
cally recognized that psychological injury and emotional distress are cog-
nizable harms of sexual harassment, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991
provides a monetary remedy for those harms. The narrow construction of
the affirmative defense not only punishes the victim to the extent that she
could have prevented the harm, but also deprives her entirely of a cause
of action.
Moreover, the Court's framework does not further the deterrence
goal it purports to embrace. The new framework does nothing to increase
an employer's incentives to try to prevent harassment nor a victim's in-
centives to minimize harm. An employer already has the incentive to try
to eliminate all sexual harassment due to the rule of automatic liability
225. See, e.g., Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 282; see also 132 CONG. R.c. S15472-01, S15489 (daily
ed. Oct. 20, 1991) (statement of Sen. Leahy) ("[W]ithout the improvements of the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, there would be no ... adequate compensation for the victim."); id. (noting that the lack of
meaningful recovery for reputational and emotional harm reduces the incentive for victims of harass-
ment to speak out); id. ("This bill goes a long way toward setting this priority straight and recogniz-
ing the importance of protecting all Americans from discrimination by providing a meaningful legal
remedy."); 137 CONG. REc. H9505-01, H9526 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Rep. Edwards)
("Compensatory damages are necessary to make discrimination victims whole from the terrible in-
jury to their careers, to their mental, physical, and emotional health, to their self-respect and dignity,
and for consequential harms.").
226. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998) (the statute aims primarily
"not to provide redress but to avoid harm"); Burlington Industries Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764
(1998) (choosing rule that will "serve Title VIl's deterrent purpose"); see also Kolstad v. American
Dental Ass'n, 119 S. Ct. 2118, 2129 (1999) (Title VlI's ."primary objective' is a 'prophylactic
one') (citing Albermarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 417).
2000]
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW
when (i) the harassment results in a tangible employment action; (ii) the
employer has no policy regarding sexual harassment; or (iii) the victim
complains. Granting the employer a windfall where the victim does not
complain adds no additional incentive. Likewise, a rule that limits dam-
ages based on the failure to mitigate harm would provide sufficient in-
centive for a sexual harassment victim to report any harassment; depriv-
ing her of liability provides no further incentive. Thus, neither of Title
VII's goals are served by this framework.
B. Inconsistency with Victim Response
The affirmative defense, which conditions an employee's right to re-
cover on her prompt filing of a complaint, unfairly punishes victims who
respond perfectly rationally to sexual harassment. The framework estab-
lished in Faragher and Ellerth relies on the basic premise that the ability
of employers to satisfactorily resolve claims of harassment using internal
grievance mechanisms depends on notice. As a theoretical matter, notice
is ensured by the affirmative defense, which requires employers to design
policies that are calculated to make victims come forward and gives vic-
tims a strong incentive to resist and report harassment at the earliest op-
portunity. In theory, then, the new regime should result in earlier notifi-
cation to the employer of harassing conduct. Armed with early notice,
employers can then step in to bring the objectionable conduct to a halt.
In some instances, harassers need only be told that their conduct is un-
welcome or impermissible in order to desist, and early notice would thus
serve the goal of prevention in those circumstances.227 In others, the em-
ployer can take swift punitive action calculated to achieve the same re-
sult. In either case, the prompt notice has at least theoretically improved
the employer's ability to respond to ongoing sexual harassment.
Because victims who delay or fail to complain prevent the prover-
bial dominoes from falling, courts applying Faragher and Ellerth punish
them by depriving them of a cause of action. Courts distinguish between
227. See David E. Terpstra, The Process and Outcomes of Sexual Harassment Claims. LAB.
L.J. 632, 633 (Oct. 1993) ("In some instances of sexual harassment, simply confronting the harasser
or telling the harasser to stop will be effective in curtailing future incidents."); see also A.L. Cul-
bertson et al., Assessment of Sexual Harassment in the Navy: Results of the 1989 Navy-wide Survey,
Report No. 92152-6800 TR-92-11 (1992) (harassment usually stops when harasser is confronted)
(cited in Jeannette N. Cleveland & Melinda E. Kerst, Sexual Harassment and Perceptions of Power:
An Under-Articulated Relationship, 42 J. OF VOCAIONAL BEHAV. 49, 59 (1993)); Alice J. Dan et al.,
Sexual Harassment as an Occupational Hazard in Nursing, 17 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL 563,
576 (1995) ("[A]ppropriate interventions can have positive effects. For example, when a supervisor
directly confronted the harasser, the behavior stopped.").
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deserving and undeserving plaintiffs under the guise of ascertaining
whether an individual victim has behaved "unreasonably" for purposes
of the second prong of the affirmative defense.22 As discussed above,
utilizing an employer's internal grievance mechanism promptly to report
any objectionable behavior is a necessary, if not always sufficient condi-
tion of "reasonableness. '229 The emerging legal definition of reasonable-
ness in this context is at odds, however, with the realities of victim re-
sponse. Thus any theoretical advantage of requiring victims to file
prompt complaints may be practically elusive. Consequently, victims of
harassment-who may be acting quite rationally under. the circum-
stances-may be unfairly penalized for failing to complain.
The literature suggests that many victims are reluctant, if not com-
pletely unwilling, to report sexual harassment to their employers. 230 Vic-
tims of sexual harassment react in myriad ways. Rather than confront the
actual or perceived risks of formally complaining about harassment,
many victims will respond in less costly ways. Appeasing the perpetrator,
rationalizing the perpetrator's actions, blaming themselves for causing the
harassment, denying the existence of harassment, and avoiding the perpe-
trator or the site of harassment are just some of the informal coping
mechanisms utilized by harassment victims. 2 31 One researcher has cata-
logued the varieties of victim response found in a dozen major
228. See supra notes 143-54, 174-76 and accompanying text.
229. See id.
230. See, e.g., Louise F Fitzgerald et al., The Incidence and Dimensions of Sexual Harassment
in Academia and the Workplace, 32 J. OF VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 152, 162 (1988) (reporting that only
three percent of their sample had attempted to report a sexual harassment experience); U.S. MERrr
SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, supra note 10, at 71 (reporting similar results from a survey); Jean W.
Adams, Sexual Harassment of University Students, 24 J.C. STUDENT PERSONNEL 484, 489 (1983)
(finding that no student experiencing sexual advances, propositions or extortion reported the incident
to university officials); see also Hearings on H.R. I, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: Hearings Before
the House Comm. On Education and Labor, 102d Congress, 1st Sess. 168, 172 (1991) (statement of
Dr. Freada Klein) (estimating that more than 90 percent of sexual harassment victims are unwilling
to report the conduct); James E. Gruber & Lars Bjorn, Women's Responses to Sexual Harassment:
An Analysis of Sociocultural, Organizational, and Personal Resource Models, 67 SOCIAL SCIENCE Q.
814 (Dec. 1986) ("For the most part, women employ passive or placating responses-ignoring it or
pretending not to notice, walking away, pretending that the harassment has no effect.").
231. See generally Fitzgerald, infra note 236, at 119-21 (contrasting internally-and externally-
focused responses to harassment); Barbara A. Gutek & Mary P. Koss, Changed Women and Changed
Organizations: Consequences of Coping with Sexual Harassment, 42 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 28, 36
(1993); Vita C. Rabinovitz, Coping with Sexual Harassment, in IVORY POWER: SEXUAL HARASSMENT
ON CAMPUS (Michael A. Paludi ed., 1990); Margaret S. Stockdale, What We Know and What We
Need to Learn about Sexual Harassment, in SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE: PERSPECTIVES,
FRONTIERS, AND RESPONSE STRATEGIES (Margaret S. Stockdale ed., 1996) (hereinafter HARASSMENT IN
THE WORKPLACE].
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surveys. 232 Classifying responses into categories, Gruber found that re-
porting harassment through internal grievance mechanisms was the least
likely victim reaction. Victims instead choose avoidance (which includes
passive reactions such as ignoring the harassment), defusion (which in-
cludes going along or making a joke of it in order to minimize conflict),
or negotiation (which includes efforts to make the harasser stop without
involving the employer) in lieu of confrontation (which includes filing an
internal complaint).2 33 The percentage of respondents in the surveys stud-
ied who opted for confrontation ranged from zero to fifteen.234 Even
among victims willing to complain, they are much more likely to tell a
friend or co-worker than a supervisor or other official. 235
The decision by many victims to forego avenues of complaint pro-
vided by the employer can fairly be described as rational, for the docu-
mented consequences of reporting harassment are quite severe.2 36 For
many sexual harassment victims, their economic circumstances dictate si-
lence.237 As Professor Martha Mahoney emphasized in her analysis of
sexual harassment victims who stay on the job (written in the wake of
the Clarence Thomas-Anita Hill conflict), few workers have the luxury of
standing up for their rights either by complaining or quitting.23 Mahoney
draws on women's reactions to other forms of workplace discrimination
to challenge the conventional wisdom that exit is the typical response to
abusive or discriminatory conditions. As she points out, the fact that
young, single women chose sterilization in order to keep their jobs at a
local battery manufacturing plant is a powerful antidote to such
generalizations .239
232. See James E. Gruber, How Women Handle Sexual Harassment: A Literature Review, 74
SOCIOLOGY & SOCIAL RESEARCH 3 (Oct. 1989).
233. Id. at 3-4.
234. Id. at 8.
235. James E. Gruber & Michael D. Smith, Women's Responses to Sexual Harassment: A Mul-
tivariate Analysis, 17 BASIC & APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 543, 545 (1995).
236. See Louise F Fitzgerald et al., Why Didn't She Just Report Him? The Psychological and
Legal Implications of Women's Responses to Sexual Harassment, 51 J. SOC. ISSUES 117, 122-23
(1995) (cataloguing empirical studies of underreporting); Denise H. Lach & Patricia A. Gwartney-
Gibbs, Sociological Perspectives on Sexual Harassment and Workplace Dispute Resolution, 42 J. Vo-
CATIONAL BEHAV. 102, 111 (1993) (same).
237. See, e.g., Ben Bursten, Psychiatric Injury in Women's Workplaces, 14 BULL. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY L. 245, 248 (1986) ("The social fact that women need employment that may not be
abundantly available tends to create a willingness to tolerate persistently abusive conditions of
work.").
238. See Martha R. Mahoney, Exit: Power and the Idea of Leaving in Love, Work and the
Confirmation Hearings, 65 S. CAL L. REv. 1283 (1992).
239. See id. at 1289.
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Fear of retaliation may also deter sexual harassment victims from
reporting the conduct.24° For women in professional careers, such as law,
medicine, or academics, silence in the face of harassment may be a cal-
culated measure to avoid losing the sponsorship or mentorship of an
older, more established male partner, doctor, or tenured professor.241
Studies demonstrate that these fears are often realized when women re-
port sexual harassment. 242 Their reticence may also stem from feelings of
fault or inadequacy, 243 the desire to avoid "reinforcing stereotypes of wo-
men as victims" by "calling attention to offensive behavior,"' 244 and a
belief that reporting the behavior will disrupt a collegial environment. 245
Reporting rates may also be suboptimal because the harm of a hos-
tile environment accrues to all employees, not just the targeted em-
240. See, e.g., Mary P. Rowe, People Who Feel Harassed Need a Complaint System with Both
Formal and Informal Options, 6 NEGOTIATION J. 161, 164 (1990) (estimating, based on experience as
ombudsperson in sexual harassment cases, that 75 percent of victims express serious concern about
retaliatory or adverse consequences for complaining); Teresa L. Butler & Michael Weber, Retaliation
Lawsuits are Increasing Rapidly, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 1I, 1999, at B5 (citing statistic that 22.5% of all
EEOC charge-processing is comprised of claims of retaliation). But cf. Natalie Dandekar, Contrasting
Consequences: Bringing Charges of Sexual Harassment Compared with Other Cases of Whistleblow-
ing, 9 J. Bus. ETHics 151, 153 (1990) (suggesting that sexual harassment complainants are often per-
ceived favorably by co-workers and suffer far less than other whistleblowers).
241. See Nina Burleigh & Stephanie B. Goldberg, Breaking the Silence: Sexual Harassment in
Law Firms, A.B.A. J. 46, 51 (Aug. 1989) ("A lot of women won't object to harassment because
they're afraid of alienating their mentors.").
242. See, e.g., FARLEY, supra note 5, at 25 (discussing surveys by Cornell and the United Na-
tions finding that women who complain about harassment are often punished for doing so); Deborah
Epstein, Free Speech at Work: Verbal Harassment as Gender-Based Discriminatory (Mis)Treatment,
85 GEO L.J. 649, 655 (1997) (citing study that found "twenty-four percent of victims surveyed were
fired because they complained about sexual harassment"); David E. Terpstra & Susan F. Cook, Com-
plaint Characteristics and Reported Behaviors and Consequences Associated with Formal Sexual
Harassment Charges, 38 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 559 (1985) (reporting that a majority of women who
filed sexual harassment complaints were ultimately dismissed from their jobs); Jan Salisbury et al.,
Counseling Victims of Sexual Harassment, 23 PSYCHOTHERAPY 316, 319-20 (1986) (reporting that
sexual harassment complainants face psychological abuse, lower performance evaluations, shunning
of co-workers and withdrawal of social support).
243. See Burleigh & Goldberg, supra note 241, at 48 ("In fact, one of the reasons women
lawyers don't report harassment is that they feel inadequate for not being able to cope with it on
their own. They see it as a character defect rather than a management problem."); Bursten, supra
note 237, at 248 (women .may not report the harassment because they feel powerless, demeaned,
and intimidated").
244. Burleigh & Goldberg, supra note 241, at 48.
245. See id. at 51 (noting the difficulties of being a "whistle-blower" and trying to remain
collegial); see also Mary P. Koss, Changed Lives: The Psychological Impact of Sexual Harassment,
in IVORY POWER: SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON CAMPUS 73, 81 (Michele A. Paludi ed., 1990); Rowe,
supra note 240, at 164 (stating that sexual harassment victims worry about disapproval from co-
workers and supervisors if they complain).
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ployee.24 The typical employee will weigh the consequences of reporting
against the benefits that will likely accrue to her personally. Because she
has no incentive to internalize the potential benefits to other employees,
the level of reporting may be dampened.247 Unless employers can over-
come these barriers and increase actual reporting, the benefits of early
notification and response cannot be captured. Thus, the affirmative de-
fense not only penalizes victims who rationally "underreport" harassment
of compensation they deserve, but also punishes all other employees by
removing any incentive to the employer to correct sexual harassment
where the victim does not complain.
The incentives given employers by the Faragher/Ellerth framework
(to enact and publicize antiharassment policies and train employees about
sexual harassment) may nonetheless have a marginal positive effect on
the rate of reporting. The "silent reaction to sexual harassment" may be
related, in part, to misconceptions and misunderstandings about the defi-
nition of sexual harassment; 248 greater information, through training or
other methods, may stem that reaction. One lesson from relevant studies
is that companies "could facilitate more reporting if public policy state-
ments and educational efforts encouraged potential victims to identify
and affirm feelings of offensiveness in response to inappropriate sexual
behaviors. ' 249 Strong statements prohibiting retaliation, which a legally
effective policy will contain, may also quell fears of adverse conse-
quences associated with reporting harassment. 2  Thus, new employer pol-
icies may have a modest influence on the reporting rate of sexual
harassment.
It would be naYve, however, to conclude that revisions to employee
handbooks and occasional training will drastically alter the complex set
of economic, psychological, and behavioral forces that keep most victims
from complaining about harassment. The likelihood of reporting may also
be influenced by the organizational structure of the workplace. Past treat-
246. See generally Charles L. Hulin et al., Organizational Influences on Sexual Harassment, in
HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 231, at 127, 145.
247. See Note, Notice in Hostile Environment Discrimination Law, supra note 180, at 1987-91
(discussing factors beyond the "rational decision" not to report harassment).
248. Linda Brooks & Annette R. Perot, Reporting Sexual Harassment: Exploring a Predictive
Model, 15 PSYCHOL OF WOMEN Q. 31, 45 (1991).
249. See id.
250. See Gruber & Smith, supra note 235, at 548. In a study designed to explore the variables
that affect women's willingness to report harassment, the authors conclude that women are more
likely to be assertive and complain where the "employee is controlled by a set of explicit policies
and procedures." Id. at 559. Such policies reinforce the primacy of professional roles over sex roles
and induce women to complain when boundaries are crossed. See id.
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ment of complaining victims may be one factor,25' as may the gender
balance in the workplace.252 Lin Farley, in an early book on sexual har-
assment, explained the complex congruence of factors that combine to
discourage reporting:
Economic need, the structure of the workplace, and female sex-role conditioning
are critical factors in the way women respond to sexual harassment. Because asser-
tions of male dominance are socially sanctioned, because men normally hold higher
rank at work, because work is a source of income, and because society trains wo-
men to be "nice," few women object to male invasiveness unless it is profoundly
disturbing.253
Studies suggest that the reaction to harassment may depend on sever-
ity,2M gender,25 5 and class.25 6 Some researchers have also suggested that
perceived offensiveness predicts reporting, and that both feminist ideol-
251. See Gruber & Smith, supra note 235, at 547 (discussing studies that correlate past treat-
ment of complaints with likelihood of reporting); Lach & Gwartney-Gibbs, supra note 236, at 371-
72.
252. See Lach & Gwartney-Gibbs, supra note 236, at 369.
253. FARLEY. supra note 5, at 23.
254. See, e.g., Baker et al., supra note I I; Gruber & Smith, supra note 235, at 546 (discuss-
ing studies that relate severity to the likelihood of reporting); M. Sullivan & Deborah I. Bybee, Fe-
male Students and Sexual Harassment: What Factors Predict Reporting Behavior?, 50(2) J. NAT'L
ASS'N WOMEN DEANS AND COUNS. il (1987).
255. See Baker et al., supra note 11, at 318. The authors of this study also found that women
were disproportionately more likely to resist unwelcome physical contact or other physically threat-
ening conduct and to report such incidents. See id.; see also, Jeremy A. Blumenthal, The Reasonable
Woman Standard: A Meta-Analytic Review of Gender Differences in Perceptions of Sexual Harass-
ment, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 33, 35 (1998) ("men and women often, but not invariably, perceive
social-sexual behavior, especially in the workplace, in different ways"); Caroline C. Cochran et al.,
Predictors of Responses to Unwanted Sexual Attentions, 21 PSYCHOL OF WOMEN Q. 207-26 (1997);
Mary A. Gowman & Raymond A. Zimmerman, Impact of Ethnicity, Gender, and Previous Exper-
iences on Prior Judgments in Sexual Harassment Cases, 26 J. OF APPLIED PSYCHOL 596-617 (1996);
Louise F. Fitzgerald, Sexual Harassment: Violence Against Women in the Workplace, 48 AM. PsY-
CHOLOGIST 1070-76 (1993); BARBARA A. GUTEK, SEX AND THE WORKPLACE (1985); Barbara A. Gutek
et al., Interpreting Social-sexual Behavior in a Work Setting, 22 J. OF VOCATIONAL BEHAv. 30 (1983);
ROSEMARIE SKAINE, POWER AND GENDER: ISSUES IN SEXUAL DOMINANCE AND HARASSMENT 178 (1996)
(citing studies showing difference between male and female perceptions of harassment). But see
Douglas D. Baker et al., Perceptions of Sexual Harassment: A Re-Examination of Gender Differ-
ences, 124 J. OF PSYCHOL. 409, 410 (1990) (suggesting that "gender differences in perceptions of
sexual harassment may be overstated"); Jeremy A. Blumenthal, supra, at 46 (concluding that studies
consistently found small, but significant gender differences in perceptions of sexual harassment).
256. Willingness to report harassment may vary along class lines. See Eileen Breshnahan, Put-
ting Your Body on the Line: A Meditation on 'Hostile Environment' Sexual Harassment in Working-
Class Perspective, 9 NAT'L WOMEN'S STUD. Ass'N J. 64 (1997) (exploring, based on her experience
with harassment as a letter-sorter with the United States Postal service, the many reasons working
class women may not report harassment to management).
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ogy and frequency of behavior affect perceived offensiveness. 257
Some of the unfairness inflicted on victims by the affirmative de-
fense could be solved if courts would take a more contextualized ap-
proach to determining "reasonableness." The law does not require that
the concept of reasonableness be developed in a legal vacuum, nor does
it normally permit the label "unreasonable" to be applied to actions that
are typical, common, or rational under the circumstances. 258 To the con-
trary, the Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged the permissibility
of, and even the need for, looking at allegations of a hostile environment
from the victim's perspective.
Although the Supreme Court has never adopted the once-popular
"reasonable woman" standard for evaluating hostile environment claims,
it has recognized the relevance of the victim's perspective.2 59 The "rea-
sonable woman" standard was justified by some courts based on the as-
sumption that there was a vast divergence between male and female per-
ceptions of sexual harassment, making it unfair to punish conduct only if
both men and women would find it to be hostile or abusive. Social scien-
tists have questioned that assumption, suggesting that empirical studies
support only a mild divergence in perceptions of harassment based on
gender. However, the Court in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services,
Inc.,260 a case addressing whether same-sex harassment could violate Title
VII, emphasized the importance of context in evaluating whether an envi-
ronment is sufficiently hostile, leaving courts free to consider the individ-
ual victim's identity and perceptions.26' Likewise, in Harris v. Forklift
257. See Brooks & Perot, supra note 249, at 45; Gruber & Smith, supra note 235, at 546 (dis-
cussing studies that found a correlation between perceived offensiveness and likelihood of reporting).
258. See generally Stephen R. Perry, Symposium, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77
IOWA L. REv. 449, 511 (1992). (commenting that "the idealization of agency that tort law has
adopted under the label of the reasonable person is presumably meant to suggest that the 'ordinary'
or 'average' person could and would have so acted"); David W. Barnes & Rosemary McCool, Rea-
sonable Care in Tort Law: The Duty to Take Corrective Precautions, 36 ARiz. L. Ritv. 357, 389-90
(1994) (discussing the "reasonable person standard").
259. The "reasonable woman" standard was adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Ellison v. Brady,
924 F2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991). The plaintiff in Harris v. Forklift Systems Inc. unsuccessfully argued
for its adoption by the Supreme Court. See generally CAROLINE FOVELL & DONNA MATrHEWS, A
LAW OF HER OWN: THE REASONABLE WOMAN AS A MEASURE OF MAN (2000) (discussing a proposi-
tion that would change law's fundamental paradigm by introducing a "reasonable woman standard"
for measuring behavior).
260. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
261. See id. at 81 ("We have emphasized, moreover, that the objective severity of harassment
should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position considering
'all the circumstances . . . [which] requires careful consideration of the social context in which par-
ticular behavior occurs and is experienced by its target"). The court further noted that juries must
look for "conduct which a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would find severely hostile or
[Vol. 61:671
EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR SEXUAL HARRASSMENT
Systems, Inc.,262 the Court clarified that harassment must be evaluated
based on the totality of the circumstances, again leaving room for consid-
eration of the context and individual plaintiff's identity.263 The reasona-
bleness of a victim's response to harassment, then, must be considered,
according to the Court's mandate, in context and from the perspective of
a reasonable victim. Such contextualization would not permit decisions
such as Marsicano, discussed above, to stand. However, even without
broadening the notion of reasonableness in this context, courts could
lessen the penalty for delaying or failing to report harassment by apply-
ing the affirmative defense to remedy rather than liability.
C. Theoretical and Doctrinal Inconsistencies
Premising an employer's liability on its response rather than the un-
derlying conduct of the employer's agent is flatly inconsistent with the
principle of vicarious liability. There is no need for vicarious liability if
employers authorize the harassment or fail to take steps to remedy a
known hostile environment because employers in that situation are di-
rectly liable for their own intentional or negligent conduct. The ostensible
basis for liability under Faragher and Ellerth is the degree to which an
harassing supervisor is aided by the agency relation. Yet victim complaint
and employer response, two factors the Court considers in determining li-
ability, have no bearing on whether the harassing supervisor was aided
by the agency relationship in accomplishing the harassment. They should,
consequently, have no effect on whether the employer is vicariously lia-
ble. This theoretical inconsistency could be cured, however, by interpret-
ing the affirmative defense to affect only damages. Such an interpretation
would in effect create a rule of strict liability, as agency principles dic-
tate, with damages subject to normal principles of mitigation.
However, the Supreme Court misapplied mitigation principles. In
Faragher and Ellerth, the Court drew on the common law doctrine of
avoidable consequences to develop the affirmative defense.264 Whether or
not that doctrine has a place in anti-discrimination law is an open ques-
tion.265 Even if it does, the Court was clumsy in adapting the general
abusive" (emphasis added). Id. at 82. At least one court has taken Oncale to open the door to a rea-
sonable woman standard. See Steinberg v. Hoshijo, 960 P.2d 1218, 1226 (Haw. 1998).
262. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
263. See id. at 23.
264. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764.
265. For a convincing argument that tort law is an inappropriate analog for discrimination law,
see generally Tracy E. Higgins, Limiting Respondeat Superior Liability: A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing?,
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principle that sexual harassment plaintiffs have a duty to mitigate harm.
Limiting a victim's damages based on the failure to take advantage of
available corrective measures has deep common law roots. Both contract
and tort law embrace the principle that plaintiffs cannot recover damages
for harm they could have prevented. Limiting liability, though, finds no
similar support in the common law generally or in anti-discrimination
law in particular.
In tort law, the relevant analog is the common law doctrine of
avoidable consequences. The Restatement of Torts provides that "one in-
jured by the tort of another is not entitled to recover damages for any
harm that he could have avoided by the use of reasonable effort or ex-
penditure after the commission of the tort." 266 As explained in the Com-
ments of the Restatement, this limitation on damages is necessitated by
public policy which "requires that persons should be discouraged from
wasting their resources, both physical or economic." 2 67 Applied in the
tort context, these policy considerations do not justify cutting off liability.
As further explained in comment a, "[I1t is not true that the injured per-
son has a duty to act, nor that the conduct of the tortfeasor ceases to be
a legal cause of the ultimate harm. .... 268
In contract law, the corollary to the doctrine of avoidable conse-
quences is the duty to mitigate damages caused by a breach of contract.
With respect to an employment contract, this duty means that the "agent
cannot recover damages for losses, which, in the exercise of due dili-
gence, he could avoid. ' 269 That is, a terminated employee has a duty to
take steps to reduce the harm caused by the breach of employment con-
tract. A variation of this duty is embraced by authoritative commentators
on damages as well and applied in cases of damages stemming from
23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1181 (1996).
266. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918(1) (1979). The Restatement also provides that
[o]ne is not prevented from recovering damages for a particular harm resulting from a tort if
the tortfeasor intended the harm or was aware of it and was recklessly disregardful of it, un-
less the injured person with knowledge of the danger of the harm intentionally or heedlessly
failed to protect his own interests.
Id. at § 918(2). The Supreme Court's construction of Title VII embodies this principle as well by
holding employers liable for sexual harassment they knew or should have known about regardless of
the existence of a policy and grievance procedure.
267. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 cmt. a (1979).
268. Id.
269. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 455 cmt. d (1958) ("[1]f a servant or other agent,
employed on a time basis to render personal services, obtains or by diligence could obtain, during
the contract period, other suitable employment ... , his damages are diminished by the amount
which he receives or should receive in such employment.").
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other legal wrongs.270
Federal employment law utilizes the doctrine of avoidable conse-
quences. For example, the doctrine has been used to limit worker recov-
ery for an employer's unfair labor practices27' and civil rights viola-
tions.272 According to the Supreme Court, Congress drew on this
"ancient principle of law,"' 273 in making "Title VII claimants subject to
the statutory duty to minimize damages set out in § 706(g). 274
Some features of the doctrine of avoidable consequences dovetail
the rules of employer liability for supervisor hostile environment harass-
ment. For example, the doctrine does not operate to reduce a victim's
damages where the victim does not know how to mitigate the harm.
275
This limitation could square perfectly with Faragher and Ellerth, which
impose a duty to mitigate only where the policy and grievance proce-
dures the employer maintains are widely disseminated and effective such
that it would be unreasonable for an employee not to report sexual har-
assment as soon as it occurs.276 But there is no precedent in tort, contract,
or discrimination law for using a principle of mitigation to erase liability,
270. See CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, LAW OF DAMAGES 127-58 (1935). The "general rule" is
stated as follows:
Where one person has committed a tort, breach of contract, or other legal wrong against an-
other, it is incumbent upon the latter to use such means as are reasonable under the circum-
stances to avoid or minimize the damages. The person wronged cannot recover for any item
of damage which could, thus have been avoided.
Id. at 127.
271. See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 197-98 (1941). In Phelps, the Supreme
Court stated:
Making the workers whole for losses suffered on account of an unfair labor practice is part of
the vindication of the public policy which the Board enforces. Since only actual losses should
be made good, it seems fair that deductions should be made not only for actual earnings by
the worker but also for losses which he willfully incurred.
272. See Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 231-32 (1982) (the doctrine of avoidable
consequences does not force an unemployed or underemployed petitioner to go into another line of
work, take a demotion, or acquire an inferior position, but he only forfeits his right to backpay if he
refuses a job which was substantially equivalent to the one he was denied).
273. Id. at 231.
274. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(l) (1994) ("Interim earnings or amounts earnable
with reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the
back pay otherwise allowable"); MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 442 (1988)
(noting that Title VII "adopts the common law obligation of a nonbreaching party to a contract to
mitigate the breaching party's damages") (citing Parker v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 474
P.2d 689 (Cal. 1970)).
275. See Marine Transp. Svcs. Sea Barge Group v. Python High Performance Marine Corp.,
16 F.3d 1133, 1140 (lth Cir. 1994) ("Manifest in this doctrine is the assumption that the injured
party knows what reasonable efforts to use to mitigate damages"); Ford Motor Co. v. Dallas Power
& Light Co., 499 F.2d 400, 414-15 (5th Cir. 1974).
276. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806, 807 (1998).
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and there is no justification for doing so in the sexual harassment
context.
The version of avoidable consequences applied to penalize sexual
harassment plaintiffs is inconsistent with that applied to other Title VII
plaintiffs. A plaintiff alleging disparate treatment under Title VII, for ex-
ample, has a claim regardless of whether she notified the employer of the
discrimination or made any attempt to prevent or correct it. And while a
disparate treatment plaintiff does have a duty to mitigate damages (i.e.
look for substitute comparable work where discrimination results in dis-
charge), the plaintiff's fulfillment of that duty has no bearing on the un-
derlying discrimination claim or the employer's liability. Disparate treat-
ment cases are a perfect example of how the avoidable consequences
doctrine can correctly be intertwined with anti-discrimination law to limit
worker recovery to damages actually caused-and unmitigatable-by an
employer's misconduct.
D. Condoning Effective Quid Pro Quo Harassment
As discussed above, the Supreme Court in Faragher and Ellerth did
not address the proper characterization of submission cases-where a su-
pervisor's threats lead to submission by a subordinate employee-for the
purposes of assessing employer liability. At least one lower court has
held that the plaintiff in a submission case does not get the benefit of the
rule of automatic liability applicable where the harassed employee suffers
a tangible employment action. 277 An employer in such a case then has the
opportunity to prove the affirmative defense. It is, of course, anomalous
to refuse to recognize that submission to a supervisor's sexual extortion
is itself an alteration in the terms and conditions of employment. It also
strains the holding in Ellerth, contradicts the principles behind it, and un-
dermines Title VII's goals of deterrence and compensation.
That mistake is compounded by construing the affirmative defense
to defeat liability. The employer in a submission case will typically be
able to make out both prongs of the affirmative defense and thus defeat
liability.278 Toward the first prong, the employer would show that it main-
277. See Hetreed v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 96-C2021, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7219 (N.D. Ill.
May 12, 1999), at *13-14 (rejecting argument that submission to supervisor's unwelcome sexual ad-
vances constituted tangible job detriment under Ellerth).
278. This may not always be true, as in some cases a victim may not have any opportunity to
complain before submitting to her supervisor's threats. Cf. Gary v. Long, 59 F.2d 1391, 1398 (D.C.
Cir. 1995) (plaintiff taken by supervisor off-premises to a warehouse where she was threatened and
then forcibly raped). And even where there is a lapse of time between the threat and the submission,
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tained an effective policy and grievance procedure and responded swiftly
upon learning of the extortion. Toward the second, the employer would
show that the employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of the pol-
icy when she submitted to the supervisor's threats instead of reporting
the threat. Having made out the affirmative defense, the rule of Scriv-
ener, Indest, Todd, and Watkins would extinguish the employer's liability
despite the supervisor's use of actual authority from the employer to ac-
complish the harassment.
E. Misallocating Risk of Harm
The imposition of true strict liability for supervisor harassment
rather than the compromise rule adopted by the Supreme Court serves
two economically desirable goals. 279 First, it forces employers to exercise
the appropriate level of care. Pre-harassment procedures and proactive
monitoring may reduce the amount of harassment, but nothing will com-
pletely eliminate the misuse of supervisory authority. A rule of automatic
vicarious liability encourages an employer to exercise the greatest care
possible in screening prospective managers, as well as in training, super-
vising, and monitoring existing supervisors. As Judge Posner suggested,
"[t]he most efficient method of discouraging sexual harassment may be
by creating incentives for the employer to police the conduct of its super-
visory employees, and this is done by making the employer liable. ' 280 In-
deed, recognition of the employer's greater opportunity to prevent harass-
ment by supervisors influenced the Court in Faragher to adopt a rule
affording vicarious liability in some circumstances:
Recognition of employer liability when discriminatory misuse of supervisory au-
thority alters the terms and conditions of a victim's employment is underscored by
the fact that the employer has a greater opportunity to guard against misconduct by
supervisors than by common workers; employers have greater opportunity and in-
if a victim fears for her physical safety it may be reasonable to submit before making a complaint.
279. For a general economic analysis of law, see ROBERT COOrER & THOMAS ULEN. LAW AND
EcONOMIcs 259-333 (2d ed. 1997). For an application of those general principles to the Title VII
context, see generally J. Hoult Verkerke, Notice Liability in Employment Discrimination Law, 81 VA.
L. REV. 273 (1995).
280. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Sex Discrimination Laws, 56 U. CH. L.
REV. 1311, 1332 (1989). Judge Posner retreated somewhat from this position in Jansen, the case ulti-
mately captioned Burlington Industries v. Ellerth by the Supreme Court. In that case, Judge Posner
issued an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which he argued that strict liability is
appropriate only where a supervisor's harassment results in an official company act. See Jansen v.
Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F2d 490, 506-17 (7th Cir. 1997). Although the Seventh Circuit major-
ity rejected this position, the Supreme Court ultimately adopted it, substituting the phrase "tangible
employment action" for "official company act."
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centive to screen them, train them, and monitor their performance.28'
Second, strict liability imports standard tools of insurance and risk
spreading into the Title VII context.282 Any perceived unfairness in hold-
ing employers liable for unfulfilled threats is outweighed by the unfair-
ness of leaving the victims of those threats without a remedy for the
harm done to them.2" 3 The employer who assumes the risks of doing bus-
iness is better able than the victim to absorb the losses, insure against
them, and distribute them. The Supreme Court's retreat from automatic
liability, therefore, shifts the burden to those who can least afford to bear
it.
F Deprivation of Attorneys' Fees
By excusing the employer from liability based on the affirmative de-
fense, the new rules deprive plaintiffs, who have suffered proven discrim-
ination under Title VII, of their statutory right to attorneys' fees. 284 The
effect of this deprivation is much broader than simply reducing the plain-
tiff's pot of gold at the end of the rainbow. Without the potential to re-
cover fees, plaintiffs will have a reduced incentive and ability to sue their
employers and enforcement of the anti-discrimination law will be under-
mined. 285 As the Supreme Court has recognized, the right to seek attor-
neys' fees under Title VII has "given the victims of civil rights viola-
tions a powerful weapon that improves their ability to employ counsel, to
obtain access to the courts, and thereafter to vindicate their rights. '286
281. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 803.
282. See, e.g., Justin P. Smith, Note, Letting the Master Answer: Employer Liability for Sexual
Harassment in the Workplace After Faragher and Burlington Industries, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1786,
1816-17 (1999) ("[S]trict liability provides compensation to victims for the harm caused by harass-
ers, a result that can be justified by corrective justice or on distributional grounds of insurance and
risk spreading").
283. See Alan 0. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the
Scope of Employment Rule and Related Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563, 607 (1988) (arguing in
the name of efficiency that all supervisor harassment should result in strict liability of the employer);
see also Smith, supra note 281, at 1816 (arguing from an economic standpoint for the imposition of
strict liability for all workplace harassment, regardless of the type of harassment or rank of the
harasser).
284. Congress added a fee-shifting provision to Title VII in 1976. See Civil Rights Attorney's
Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000).
285. See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 743 (1986) ("Congress authorized fee shifting to im-
prove enforcement of civil rights legislation by making it easier for victims of civil rights violations
to find lawyers willing to take their cases.").
286. Id.; see also Amy Holzman, Denial of Attorneys' Fees for Claims of Sexual Harassment
Resolved Through Informal Dispute Resolution: A Shield for Employers, A Sword Against Women, 63
FORDHAM L. REV. 245, 260 (1994) (criticizing court opinions that deny attorneys' fees to sexual har-
[Vol. 61:671
EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR SEXUAL HARRASSMENT
This greater access to lawyers and courts for individual victims pro-
duces a broader benefit to society: individuals are given the incentive and
the means to share the burden of enforcing federal civil rights laws. In
an early case interpreting Title II, the public accommodations analog to
Title VII, the Supreme Court acknowledged the importance of fee-
shifting in facilitating the public-private enforcement scheme for federal
civil rights laws:
If successful plaintiffs were routinely forced to bear their own attorneys' fees, few
aggrieved parties would be in a position to advance the public interest by invoking
the injunctive power of the federal courts. Congress therefore enacted the provision
for counsel fees-not simply to penalize litigants who deliberately advance argu-
ments they know to be untenable, but, more broadly, to encourage individuals in-
jured by racial discrimination to seek judicial relief under Title II [of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964].2s7
The threat of attorneys' fees may also serve to encourage employer com-
pliance with civil rights laws. 288
The new rules, as intended and applied, deny plaintiffs and society
of important benefits. The Faragher/Ellerth scheme, by sometimes elimi-
nating liability, and thus access to attorneys fees, even where actionable
discrimination has been proven, undermines the civil rights of individual
plaintiffs and society at large.
IV. A PROPOSED SOLUTION
As discussed in the previous section, a rule that permits plaintiffs to
suffer actionable harassment, yet deprives them of liability based on the
failure to complain is inherently unfair and undermines the goals of Title
VII. In this Part, I urge Congress to remedy the Supreme Court's inter-
pretation-and lower courts' misinterpretation--of Title VII by amending
the statute. Specifically, I argue herein that, instead of being completely
absolved of liability, employers who respond diligently upon learning of
hostile environment harassment should be rewarded, if at all,28 9 in terms
assment plaintiffs utilizing informal resolution processes).
287. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per curiam); see also
Evans, 475 U.S. at 745 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Congress provided fee awards to ensure that there
would be lawyers available to plaintiffs who could not otherwise afford counsel, so that these plain-
tiffs could fulfill their role in the federal enforcement scheme as private attorneys' general, vindicat-
ing the public interest.").
288. See, e.g., Hensley v. Eckerhardt, 461 U.S. 424, 443 n.2 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Cooper v. Singer, 719 F.2d 1498, 1501 (10th Cir. 1983); Shadis v. Beal,
685 F2d 824, 829 (3d Cir. 1982); Oldham v. Ehrlich, 617 F.2d 163, 168 (8th Cir. 1980).
289. The bulk of the criticism presented in this article applies with equal force to a much
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of remedy. Such an approach would require that the rule of automatic lia-
bility established in Faragher and Ellerth apply regardless of employer
response (contrary to Todd, Indest, and Watkins) and that the affirmative
defense operate only to reduce or eliminate damages rather than avoid li-
ability (contrary to Scrivener).290 The upshot of this approach is that all
plaintiffs who are subjected to a legally hostile environment by a supervi-
sor would be entitled to a finding of liability against the employer, but,
in some cases, a plaintiff might not be entitled to any damages as a pen-
alty for her own failure to mitigate.
Federal anti-discrimination law has on numerous occasions recog-
nized the value of holding institutions liable for discriminatory acts even
where the individual victim, for one reason or another, may not be enti-
tled to monetary compensation. Thus, in the context of mixed-motive dis-
crimination, after-acquired evidence, and school-based sexual harassment,
Congress and the Supreme Court have crafted techniques for reaching
such a result.
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,291 the Supreme Court considered an
employer's liability when it made an employment decision based partly
on a permissible basis and partly on an impermissible, discriminatory ba-
sis. Ann Hopkins, a senior manager at a professional accounting firm,
brought suit under Title VII after being denied a partnership in the
firm.292 A splintered Supreme Court ruled that "once a plaintiff shows
that gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, the
defendant may avoid a finding of liability only by proving that it would
have made the same decision even if it had not allowed gender to play
broader proposition: that there should be no affirmative defense in hostile environment cases, sub-
jecting employers to strict liability for all supervisor harassment.
290. Early on, Professor Susan Estrich urged courts to abandon the requirement that hostile
environment harassment be severe or pervasive. See Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV.
813, 843-47 (1991) ("[T]he pervasiveness of the harassment should be relevant to the question of
what relief is appropriate .... But it does not inevitably follow that there is no harm in harassing, so
long as it is sporadic"). The quantum and severity of harassment, she argued, should affect the
amount of recovery rather than the existence of liability. See id. Professor Estrich' reasoning, that
even sporadic or incidental harassment can be harmful to female workers, supports the interpretation
of employer liability advocated in this article. Professor B. Glenn George has also argued that the
concept of an actionable hostile environment should be construed to encompass all harassing behav-
ior, however trivial. B. Glenn George, The Back Door: Legitimizing Sexual Harassment Claims, 73
B.U. L. REV. 1, 21 (1993). By building in a layer of harassment that is not actionable, Professor
George argued, the daily working lives of women are unmistakably different-both symbolically and
practically-4han those of their male counterparts. See id.
291. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
292. See id. at 232.
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such a role. ' '"93 The effect of the Court's decision was to give employers
the freedom to discriminate in employment decisions as long as they
could provide an additional, independent basis for such decisions.
With the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress strongly repudiated the
Supreme Court's interpretation of employer liability in mixed-motive
cases. 294 Section 107 of the act specified that Title VII makes employers
liable for any employment decision where discrimination on a prohibited
basis was "a motivating factor" for the decision. 295 Thus, under the 1991
amendment to Title VII, an employer who allows sex discrimination to
influence an employment decision is held liable for that discrimination
regardless of whether it did make or could have made the same decision
on legitimate bases. However, in order to avoid unjust penalties for an
employer with independent legitimate reasons for their employment deci-
sions, Congress limited the available remedies when an employer is able
to demonstrate that it would have taken the same action in the absence of
the impermissible motivating factor.296
The Supreme Court adopted the same approach in McKennon v.
Nashville Banner Publishing Co., a case involving after-acquired evi-
dence.297 There, the Court was presented with the question of whether to
hold an employer liable for a discriminatory firing (in that case based on
age) where the employer discovered evidence-after the employee has
been terminated-that would have led to the employee's termination on
lawful and legitimate grounds. 29
In McKennon, the plaintiff was allegedly terminated in violation of
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), but testified in her
deposition that she had copied and removed confidential documents from
293, Id. at 244.
294. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, Nov. 21, 1991, 105 Stat. 1071, codified
as 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
295. Section 107 amends 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2 to provide, in relevant part: "(m) Except as oth-
erwise provided in this subchapter, an unlawful employment practice is established when the com-
plaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor
for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice." Id.
296. Section 107 also amends 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g) to provide, in relevant part:
(B) On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under 703(m) and a respondent
demonstrates that the respondent would have taken the same action in the absence of the im-
permissible motivating factor, the court--(i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief...
and attorney's fees and costs demonstrated to be directly attributable only to the pursuit of a
claim under section 2000e-2(m) of this title; and (ii) shall not award damages or issue an or-
der requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment ....
Id.
297. 513 U.S. 352 (1994).
298. See id. at 354.
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the office, thereby violating her employment agreement and providing in-
dependent grounds for termination.299 The Court rejected the suggestion
that McKennon was deprived of any cause of action under the ADEA by
virtue of her supervening misconduct. 300 That approach, said the Court,
would undermine Congress' efforts to eradicate workplace discrimination.
Title VII's twin goals of compensation and deterrence would be better
served by encouraging the private litigant to seek a judgment of liability
even where damages might be limited.301 Each judgment of liability fur-
thers the objectives of the statute and makes it easier to demonstrate a
pattern or practice of discrimination. 3°1 For these reasons, the Court re-
jected the application of any type of unclean hands principle where a pri-
vate suit serves important public purposes or where Congress authorizes
broad equitable relief to serve important national policies. Therefore, the
Court concluded that after-acquired evidence of misconduct could only
be used to limit damages, consistent with their view that fairness requires
courts to take into account the employee's wrongdoing in fashioning "ap-
propriate remedial action. ' 303 However, the plaintiff's cause of action is
preserved in this situation.
Finally, the Supreme Court has created a similar structure for sexual
harassment claims under Title IX. Title IX prohibits schools that receive
any federal financial assistance from discriminating on the basis of sex.304
Sexual harassment, under Title IX, is proscribed as a form of intentional
sex discrimination, 3 5 and any individual who can prove a violation may
be entitled to monetary damages as well as equitable relief and attorneys'
fees.306
In 1997, the Office for Civil Rights issued a Policy Guidance on
sexual harassment, which set forth its guidelines for preventing and cor-
recting sexual harassment and the standards by which it will hold schools
liable for violations. 307 Pursuant to the Policy Guidance, a school is auto-
matically liable for all quid pro quo harassment and teacher-student hos-
299. See id. at 356.
300. See id. at 357.
301. See id.
302. See id. at 358.
303. See id. at 362.
304. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1990).
305. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Schools, 503 U.S. 60, 74-75 (1992). The Supreme
Court recently clarified that an educational institution may be held liable under Title IX for failing to
prevent a hostile environment created by students as well as teachers. See Davis v. Monroe County
Bd. of Educ., 119 S. Ct. 1661 (1999).
306. See Franklin, 503 U.S. at 75-76.
307. See id.
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tile environment harassment.3 8 In addition, a school may be held liable
for a hostile environment created by students or third parties if it knew
oi should have known of the harassment and failed to stop it.3°9
However, two recent Supreme Court decisions severely limited the
circumstances under which a school may be forced to pay monetary
damages for sexual harassment. In Gebser v. Lago-Vista Independent
School District,310 the Court held that monetary damages are available for
teacher-student sexual harassment only where school officials with the
capacity to stop the harassment had actual notice of the harassment and
responded with deliberate indifference. 31' In Davis v. Monroe County
Board of Education,3 2 the Court applied that same standard to claims in-
volving peer harassment. 313 Thus, to the extent that plaintiffs seek money
damages from an educational institution, Title IX does not recognize a
theory of imputed liability; that is, a school can only be forced to pay
damages based on its own negligence-its failure to act in the face of a
known situation of harassment.
However, neither Gebser nor Davis has any effect on a plaintiff's
ability to hold a school liable for harassment and obtain equitable relief
under the standards elucidated in the Policy Guidance. 314 Thus, a plaintiff
who fails to prove actual notice to an appropriate official of sexual har-
assment will be unable to collect damages, but may nonetheless obtain a
finding of liability.
In three important areas of federal anti-discrimination law, therefore,
plaintiffs are entitled to a finding of liability-a judgment that the em-
ployer discriminated-even where circumstances dictate that damages are
inappropriate. The same approach should be taken in the context of su-
pervisor sexual harassment under Title VII. Portions of Faragher and El-
lerth should be overruled or Title VII should be directly amended to es-
tablish that the affirmative defense can only affect the remedies available
to the victim of supervisor sexual harassment. The employer should be
308. See id.
309. See Office for Civil Rights, Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by
School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12034-01 (1997).
310. 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
311. See id. at 290-91.
312. 119 S. Ct. 1661 (1999).
313. See id. at 1671-72.
314. In Gebser's wake, the Secretary of Education issued a letter indicating his intent to con-
tinue enforcing Title IX according to the standards set forth in the Policy Guidance. See Letter from
Richard Riley, Secretary of Education, to President Clinton re: sexual harassment and Title IX (Janu-
ary 28, 1999) (available at <http://www.ed.gov/News/Letters/990128.html>).
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held liable based solely on the occurrence of the harassment at the hands
of an agent.
CONCLUSION
As this article has demonstrated, the law of sexual harassment has
taken two steps forward, but one step back. The standards for liability
adopted by the Court provide substantial incentives for employers to pre-
vent harassment. Better grievance procedures may also resolve harass-
ment disputes more satisfactorily than before. But where neither preven-
tion nor internal band-aids are successful, the new rules will often
produce unfair results. If the affirmative defense is construed to bar lia-
bility in some or all cases, sexual harassment victims who have suffered
actionable discrimination are often deprived of compensation for harass-
ment even where agency principles seem to dictate employer liability.
This deprivation comes under circumstances where other victims of dis-
crimination would recover and undermines the goals of Title VII. As it
has done before in analogous situations, Congress should step in and cor-
rect the problem.
Even the change recommended in this article, however, will not be
enough to level the playing field for women in the workforce. Until sex-
ual harassment is eliminated, women always work at a disadvantage
compared to their male counterparts. A pinch here, and a leer there can
undermine the confidence, ability, and success of a female worker. No
amount of money can restore those losses, especially where the system is
designed to tolerate a moderate level of noncompensable harassment. Un-
derstanding the causes of harassment and the ability of legal deterrents to
prevent it is an important area for future research.
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